CUPRINS nr. 125


UE si resursele

EU, BSEC and Energy Co Operation


This article is dedicated to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization. It presents the various economics projects which could animate the economic and political life on the shores of Black Sea. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation is based on the principles laid down in the Helsinki Final Act, the follow-up Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) documents and, particularly, in the Paris Charter for a New Europe, and on shared values such as democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, prosperity through economic liberty and social justice and equal security for all the Participating States.

The Black Sea coastal zone is densely populated, containing a permanent population of approximately 16 million and another 4 million visitors during the summer tourist season.

There is one close connection between Black Sea Region and Trans-Carpathian area (“Crystal

The creation of a full-fledge free trade zone including Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan2. The alliance duplicates the Eurasian Economic Community which already exists and many experts doubt that economic organization function independently3.

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC)

Since ancient times the Black Sea area has been the cradle of different civilizations, the renowned crossroads between Asia and Europe where people of different nationalities, trades, cultures and religions intermingled. In no way was that process an easy one; periods of peace and tranquility were followed by protracted conflicts and wars.

But even in that climate the Black Sea area was well-known for its developed trade relations and contacts. Attempts were undertaken to build bridges of rapprochement. It is sufficient to mention the famous Silk Road which linked the countries of Europe and Asia. A valuable experience of contact among the peoples of the two continents as well as of the cohabitation and mutual enrichment of different cultures has been accumulated.

Only in the last decade of the twentieth century however, when the atmosphere of the cold war, suspicion and mistrust has receded, have the countries of the Black Sea area been able to undertake bold steps in that direction. They are together and decide how, in the age of the globalization of economies, valuable assets in their possession, such as geographical proximity, common history, cultural bonds and the interdependence of their national economies could be efficiently employed for mutual benefit and prosperity.

The Black Sea is strategically located between southeast Europe and Asia Minor and it connects its littoral to the Mediterranean Sea and the world beyond. After the collapse of communism and the break-up of the former Soviet Union, at the Turkey’s initiative the countries of this region signed a declaration that set BSEC.

The new organization was confronted with problems of cultural diversity, economic stagnation, and opposing geopolitical agendas. Turkey desired to expand its influence in the area and pushed for increased economic cooperation. Russia sought to perpetuate its political and military domination. Romania and Bulgaria pursued its policy of Euro-Atlantic integration, Ukraine and Georgia sought to assert their newly independence from Moscow, while NATO adopted open-door policies with the intention of expanding into the region4.

In June 1992 the Heads of State and Government of eleven countries: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine met upon the invitation of the Government of Turkey in Istanbul. This Summit was successfully crowned with the signing of the historic document5.

One of the basic objectives of the BSEC, proclaimed in the "Summit Declaration", is to ensure that the Black Sea becomes a sea of peace, stability and prosperity, encouraging friendly and good-neighborly relations6.

The day of 25 June 1992 launched the process known to the world today is the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the BSEC has become a symbol for a new regional cooperation model7.

Not less important is the decision of the Heads of State and Government in June 1992 that their economic cooperation be developed in a manner not contravening their obligations and not preventing the promotion of relations of the Participating States with third parties8, including international organizations as well as the European Union and cooperation within regional initiatives9.

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation is based on the principles laid down in the Helsinki Final Act, the follow-up Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) documents and, particularly, in the Paris Charter for a New Europe and on shared values such as democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, prosperity through economic liberty and social justice and equal security for all the Participating States10.

Since its establishment, the BSEC manage to define common goals, obtain recognition as an international organization and set up functional institutions. By developing co-operation in spheres of common interest, the BSEC has proven to be a useful forum for broad multilateral dialogue on various issues of economic co-operation.

His transformation into a regional economic organization, while opening new prospect, had also raised new questions and highlighted challenged. Unemployment and poverty in much of the region have steadily risen; extreme nationalism has developed to the stage militancy; the notion of ethnically pure states has been gaining implicit acceptance and legitimacy; a number of areas in the BSEC region are either in open armed conflict or on the verge of create an obstacle to their immediate inclusion and active participation in joint programs and projects.

Other shortcomings include: 1) a discrepancy between the proclaimed objectives and the degree of implementation of projects adopted under BSEC aegis; 2) low efficiency in implementing decisions, the financial difficulties of member states, insufficient co-ordination and exaggerated bureaucracy; 3) a lack of interest from the governments reflected in a low level of governmental representation in the intergovernmental meetings; 4) at the level of national governmental authorities aims, determining priorities and long-term term issues; 5) an absence of a unified approach and action on the part of two main components of the organization - the governmental and parliamentary one.

The goals and principles embodied in the Summit Declaration of the BSEC are in full conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. As a unique and promising model aimed at fostering interaction and harmony among the Participating States, the BSEC will undoubtedly contribute to the creation of a future Europe-wide economic zone and promote mutual understanding, peace and security in the region11.

The BSEC summit formally upgraded the five-year-old regional grouping to international status. The 11 members of BSEC signed a charter at the summit in Yalta, Ukraine, allowing the group's elevation to an official international organization12.

The EU has invested heavily in this regionalism in the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas, with the Northern Dimension initiative and the Barcelona Process. Lip service is given to regionalism in the EU’s new neighbourhood policy, but the accent there is nonetheless on bilateralism. The Black Sea has so far been the only natural region of the EU’s periphery to have been ignored13.

Some years ago, BSEC invited the EU to become an observer, which it declined, although it may now be persuaded to take a more positive view. More recently, however, Russia has been saying to BSEC high officials that active EU involvement would not be welcome. BSEC has also recently declined the offer by the US to become an observer of BSEC, which does not yet have a reply.

The EU must be heavily involved in its neighbouring of the Black Sea in unilateral, bilateral or multilateral ways, for avoiding the as a lack of EU interest in the region14. The formal participation in the BSEC activities – would be a most welcome move for Black Sea region-building - regardless of EU membership prospects. EU membership of BSEC could be a variant.

The time has come for some new Black Sea regional initiative. The issue is not so much whether, but how, given well-known political sensitivities. Romania can to propose to the EU to co-sponsor a fresh initiative that might be called the Black Sea Forum. This would draw on the experiences of Finland’s Northern Dimension initiative and the Balkan Stability Pact. The first act would be a conference of a Black Sea Forum, to which Romania with the EU would invite all BSEC member states, the BSEC secretary general and the United States.

The EU would make an up-front offer of financial resources from the New Neighbourhood Financial Instrument. The EU would thus not be proposing to become a member of BSEC, but would be offering a Forum in which BSEC and its member states could submit ideas and projects of regional interest that could make use of extra resources from the EU or US.

In this respect, it would also draw on Northern Dimension experience, which did not take over or displace the pre-existing Baltic or Barents Sea organizations, but offered them an enhanced political framework for their activities. It would draw on the Balkan Stability Act model in including the US. Following a first meeting of the Black Sea Forum, the EU Commission would draw up a Black Sea Action Plan in the framework of its neighbourhood policy15.

What is needed now is for the Commission to prepare a comprehensive set of White (or Green) Papers detailing the range of options for the partner states to associate with EU policies16. In addition, the term “Neighbourhood Policy” could be change with “European Integration Policy”17.

While the presumption in favour of enhanced Black Sea cooperation is now strong, it is far from obvious how a fresh initiative might most plausibly be initiated. There is a complex set of political jealousies inhibiting too much leadership from any of the big players – Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, EU, NATO or US. Even Ukraine cannot be too pushy without upsetting Turkey, which is not in GUAM.

Regional Initiatives in the Black Sea Area

The intense will for change that is driving riverbank Black Sea countries into designing their future destiny could be the energy that Euro-Atlantic solidarity needs today18. All of them belong to a historic generation marked by the revolution for democratic values; belong to historic cycle that has transformed the political map of a Europe once divided by The Iron Curtain.

On the whole, the Black Sea represents an area which is steadily evolving while regional co-operation faces many faces.

The Black Sea area is a traditional transit zone and increasingly an important energy producer. This area is one of most diverse and complex region of Europe. Since the early nineties of former century it is undergoing a painful process of geopolitical restructuring. In the XXI Century the significance of the region will grow significantly due to its size, strategic location (at the crossroads of Europe and Asia), rich natural resources, and economic potential and gradually emerging coherence.

The actual time of international exchange and globalization has opened new possibilities. At the same time the Black Sea is attracting the interest of all major international players. For Russia it has been for centuries of vital importance. The objective interests of the European Union, especially in view of its expected enlargement, push it also toward obtained influence in the region. The USA has too extended its grip on the Black Sea, through the use of diplomatic, economic and occasionally military means in an effort not to be excluded from this part of the world by creation of a wider Europe.

The volume of regional activity is daunting and it is difficult to keep track of what is going on, where and with whom. The regional debates could help the process of inter-linking different activities (this would require careful co-ordination at the national level between all those involved one way or the other with riverbank Black Sea countries). Getting Western countries on board would help this process, and might contribute at a regional level to the development of a co-coordinated strategy for the Black Sea. There is still a need to identify practical issues of common priority addressed in other framework and to include actions designated to promote rapid adoption of key European standards. In this context, NATO must persevere, with decisiveness and consistency.

There is one absence of adequate promotion of co-operation on the Black Sea region. Central government structure must promote the idea of co-operation to the local governments and municipalities and one of the future tasks must be to create a Black Sea region in the minds of its people. Since the BSEC remains a predominantly governmental initiative, it is difficult to evolve to one reality for everyone. Local governments, private business, NGOs and academic communities should be more actively engaged in the Black Sea community process. Coalition of the public, private and non-governmental sector might be created to jointly deal with some specific issues pertaining to Black Sea co-operation.

The BSEC’s ultimate success would depend on its ability to achieve results in the implementation of energy, transport, communication, investment and environmental projects as the most fruitful area off co-operation.

The involvement in regional initiatives of riverbank countries of the Black Sea are is a significant advantage. They are the bridge between Western Europe and Southern Caucasus, Central Asia and Middle East.

They could offer a shield of political and economic stability and a nucleus that radiates European values. It could be identified a set of priority for regional co-operation in the Black Sea area:
- Trade and investment: removing obstacles to private investment and monitoring the overall investment climate;
- Infrastructure (including energy): building up regional energy co-operation, based on a commitment to bring about a regional energy concept;
- Cross-border co-operation: reaching a sub-regional agreement on functional cross-border issues (border management, infrastructure);
- Fight organized crime: strengthening the role of the Stability Pact Fighting Organized Crime Initiative and SECI Center in Bucharest;
- Streamlining regional initiatives (CEI, BSEC, SECI), in order to harmonize approaches and activities.

Transport Area

One top priority to the region and to the Pan-European transport program area is the construction of four trans European infrastructure corridor system through the BSEC region. The development of this sector will play a great role in developing economic co-operation in the region and its future integration in the Europe transport network.


For solving the environmental problems of the Black Sea basin, Romania could support the public access to environmental information and public participation in the environmental decision - making process in the region of Black Sea and to undertake a strategic environmental assessment for major pipelines to be built in the area for transporting energy resources (oil and gas).

The Black Sea Region includes the marine and coastal waters of Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine.

Energy Co-Operation

Energy co-operation was qualified as the base for the integration of the BSEC countries; hence the close co-operation between countries with energy resources and those without is essential.

Gas Reserves around Europe
Romania can suggest a program of developing an energy complex of member states, which would include an assessment of energy resources of individual member states, an assessment of their energy demands and the elaboration of recommendation and measures for developing stage by stage such an energy complex of BSEC member states by the year 2010. Such an initiative could add strong impetus to the activity of the organization, assist in overcoming economic difficulties and contribute to national development programs.

It could be made a scientific assessment of the feasibility and opportunity of gas transportation under the Black Sea as well as the eventual consequences are strongly needed with due account of the high contest of hydrogen sulphide at the bottom layer and the risk of the region’s seismisity. The issue of oil pipelines is also very important for the future of the region.

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline

On May 25th, 2005, the 1,800 km Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline officially opened for business some 13 years after its conception and at a cost of $4 billion. The pipeline, built by a consortium led by Britain's BP, will bring Caspian oil from Azerbaijan across the Caucasus to the Mediterranean coast of Turkey, from where it will be tankered to markets worldwide. When it is fully operational it could transport 1m barrels a day, just over 1% of the world's current oil consumption19.

The BTC pipeline, though the most expensive option for exporting Caspian oil, was backed by America because it avoided Russia, thereby reducing the dependence of the Caucasus and Central Asia on Russian pipelines. The pipeline also provided an opportunity to bolster regional economies that the West is courting, especially those of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey and build support for America in the region20.

The development of Caspian oil and gas make a significant contribution to world energy supplies, while providing attractive investment and business opportunities to international entities21. Oil Business of international petroleum industry22 could choice between Iranian options23 and Black Sea area. There are many interests24 and also, many scenarios: to rehabilitate and upgrade the 20-30 year old Central Asia-Center natural gas pipelines system from Turkmenistan to Russia and Ukraine25. Also, there a few success stories regarding the building gas stations, fuel terminals by western engineering giants26.

Ukraine’s state pipelines company is moved toward reversing the use of Odessa-Brody oil pipelines in Russia’s favor. This pipeline, which was completed in 2001 to bring Caspian oil to the country and, to Poland and Western Europe with the hope to reduce Ukraine’s dependence on Russia oil, diversifies Poland and, especially, Germany’s supplies27. In this question, one important player is Gazprom28.

In the oil business Georgia has one important role29. Western government and businesses are closely watching Georgia, where a pipeline is under construction to carry Caspian oil across The Caucasus through Georgia and Turkey to Western markets in 200530.

The Black Sea-Adriatic oil pipeline

The five countries - Romania, Serbia, Monte Negro, Slo­venia, Croatia and Italy - planning to build a crude oil pipeline which aims to link the Romanian Black Sea Port of Constanta to Italian Adriatic ports deciding to increase the annually transport capacity to 60 mm tons.

The 1,360 km pipeline, named "The Pan European Pipeline", aiming to link Constanta port to Adriatic Sea is seen as the short way for the Caspian crude oil to western markets.

The overall project was estimated at some $ 1 bn.

Nabucco Gas Pipeline

The Nabucco project is a joint venture between Botas, Bulgargaz, Transgaz, MOL and OMV, and will receive financial advice from ABN Amro. The value of the project is estimated at 4.4bn. The pipeline will transport gas from the Middle East and the Caspian region through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to Baumgarten in Austria.

The Strategic Goals of Project Nabucco Gas Pipeline31:
- Gas supply for Europe from Caspian Region/Central Asia/Middle East
- Raise transit role of participatingcountries
- Contribution to security of supply for partner countries and for Europe as a whole
- Strengthening the role of Austrian pipeline grid within the European network.

Nabucco Gas Pipeline32 is a new gas supply route to Europe from Turkey to Austria via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary33.

The Nabucco project is included in the EU Trans European Network programme (TEN). The European Union has supported the feasibility study of the project.

The joint venture agreement governs co-operation between the individual companies. The agreement incorporates adoption of the new name of the Nabucco consortium, Nabucco Gas Pipeline International Ltd, which replaced Nabucco Company Pipeline Study GmbH after completion of the feasibility study. Nabucco Company Pipeline Study GmbH was founded in June 2004.

Nabucco Gas Pipeline
Under its new name, the company has broadened its tasks and objectives, which now include all the activities of a Transmission System Operator (TSO). Nabucco Gas Pipeline International Ltd. is now responsible for drawing up the financing concept of the whole project, co-ordinating the next project phases and establishing the national Nabucco companies in the individual partner countries Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria.


1 See, Anonymous, Special Report: Behind the crystal curtain - Russia’s western border, Economist, 2003, Oct 25, p:25.
2 See, Grigoryeva Yekaterina, Hostefeathers, Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, 2003, Oct 22, p:15.
3 See, Vasilyeva Vasilina, Clone of Eurasec, Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, 2003, Mar 26, p:13.
4 See, Dima Nicholas, The Black Sea Region: New economic cooperation and old geopolitics, Journal of Social, Political, & Economic Studies, 2003, Spring, p:77.
5 Summit Declaration on Black Sea Economic Cooperation.
6 The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Pact has used the European Union as a model. Unlike the EU, the BSEC does not constitute a regional organization in a legal sense since it is based on an agreement binding under international law. See, Nash Michael, The European Union as a Template, Contemporary Review, 2003 Jan, p:7.
7 The Black Sea Economic Co-operation Region, a treaty signed by eleven countries, is one of the most dramamtic change to have taken place in the region since the fall of the Berlin wall. Passage through the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits is at the heart of the issues concerning the Black Sea because the transport of oil and gas from the Caspian sea is one of the region’s pivotal questions, Vaner Semih, A strategic sea, UNESCO Courier, Jul 1998, p:43.
8 Applications to join came from Yugoslavia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Uzbekistan and Iran. Discussion however was referred to a future meeting, under the presidency of Moldavia, due to a lack of preparation. Ministers said that the issue was yet right for a decision, 27-Oct-99 Athens News Agency.
9 The disappearance of the Soviet Union from the political map of the world steered the search for a new geopolitical order into the channel of creating a “global power”, while simultaneously giving rise to a demand for an alternative world scheme. Between the ruined world order and the one being sought (which remains unformed), there are transitional stages and elements of continuity. These include: 1) the preservation of the outward signs of Russia’s superpower might (its natural resources, transcontinental communications, nuclear weapons, and orbital space program); 2) the emergence of signs of discord in the American-European transatlantic alliance. America’s geographical distance from the Eurasian continent; the main storehouse of the world’s resources; and the USA’s dependency on oil imports result in the contradiction between the global nature of the United State’s pretensions and the localized character of its geostrategic base. Attempts by the second Bush Administration to resolve this contradiction through world-wide military intervention are inadequate to the dynamics of development of global processes. In particular, they increase the probability of the global oil market’s disintegration and of the disintegration of the world economy as a whole and raise the prospect of entering an era of “post-globalization”. By Vladimir Maksimenko, The Temptation and Illusion of Global Administration.
10 The use of the concept “international society” helps one to consider critically the established concepts of the role institutions and culture play in the area of international economic policy. Institutions and culture determine the behavior of nations, imparting social expediency to their actions. Nuances in one’s understanding of the responsibility of a state as a participant in international economic relations depend on the socio-cultural particulars of one society or another. The institutionalization of economic relations can hardly be reduced to the establishment of politically neutral behavioral rules and standards (there are none). Objectively, economic globalization blunts the effectiveness of using instruments of national economic policy; this motivates nations to support one another, and to take part in collective actions. Depending on regional specifics, it is possible to identify three ideal types of international society in which states that act as economic entities beyond national borders take part. These three types differ in the elements of culture (rational, values-oriented, or affective) which are most important for them. See Marina Strezhneva, International Societies of Economic Entities.
11 Project Promotion Fund (31-Oct-03); Foreign Affairs (Yerevan, 18-Apr-03); Parliamentary Assembly (Baku, 11-Mar-03); Istanbul BSEC Summit (28-JUN-02, MPA); Istanbul BSEC Summit (25-JUN-02, AP); EU-Black Sea States Summit Meeting (15-APR-02); Technical Cooperation Fund by Back Sea Bank (5-JUL-01); Back Sea Earthquake Protection Agencies Association in Thessaloniki (9-JUN-01); Joint Statement - Transport (Sochi, 30-Mar-01); Istanbul Summit Declaration (18-Nov-99); BSEC ministers defer new member’s decision (27-Oct-99); BSEC Environment Ministers in Thessaloniki (24-SEP-99); BSEC to Abolish Double Taxation (19-OCT-98); Germany's bid for BSEC observer status (26-AUG-98).
12 The BSEC is comprised of Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Georgia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Greece. 6 May 1998, reported by Athens News Agency.
13 A comprehensive account of Black Sea cooperative initiatives to date is given by Mustafa Aydin in “Europe’s New Region: The Black Sea in the Wider Europe Neighbourhood”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, May 2005.
14 “The EU has acquired a considerable regionalist experience in its neighbourhood and this must be inserted into the ENP. There is for the EU the opportunity and time to calibrate its role in, and support for, the region - this is testified to by the fact that the EU still does not participate in the work of the BSEC.” Fabrizio TASSINARI, “Security and Integration in the EU Neighbourhood. The Case for regionalism”, CEPS Working Document No. 226/July 2005, p.17.
15 “A final political question is whether Russia would join in such an initiative. According to past experience, Russia will initially express its scepticism or hostility. However, when the invitations go out for the first meeting of the Black Sea Forum, it might become apparent that all the invitees except Russia were accepting, and then Russia would come along too.” Michael Emerson, Centre for European Policy Studies, The Black Sea as Epicentre of the Aftershocks of the EU’s Earthquake, CEPS Policy Brief, No. 79/July 2005.
16 For a detailed presentation, see M. Emerson, The Wider Europe Matrix, CEPS, 2004; and for an updated account, European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy of Placebo, CEPS Working Paper No. 215, November 2004 (available at
17 Michael Emerson, Centre for European Policy Studies, The Black Sea as Epicentre of the Aftershocks of the EU’s Earthquake, CEPS Policy Brief, No. 79/July 2005.
18 The major opportunity for action is to integrate the former global enemy in a system of global solidarity ans subsidiary in which the power centre have an exclusively character. See, Adrian Severin, Why NATO Needs Romania, Romania NATO, Edited by Adrian Nastase, p:356.
19 The strategic value of Caspian oil did not escape Adolf Hitler. He fatally over-extended his army's supply lines with a dash to secure the region's oil reserves, resulting in a decisive defeat at Stalingrad. Russia kept control of the region's oil until the break-up of the Soviet Union. Then western governments and oil companies, searching for fresh sources of oil in a bid to reduce reliance on the Middle East, advanced on the Caspian themselves. But the region has failed to live up to its early promise. Azerbaijan is never likely to become the new Kuwait. America's Energy Information Administration estimates that the Caspian region has oil reserves of between 17 billion and 33 billion barrels, rather than the 200 billion touted in the mid-1990s, plus a fair bit of natural gas. See, Andrew Neff, Global Insight, Washington, DC, Where business meets geopolitics, in / Global Agenda, London, May 25, 2005.
20 Upgrading an alternative route through Georgia to Supsa on the Black Sea would have made for a far shorter (and cheaper) pipeline. But Turkey complained that it would lead to an unsustainable level of shipping passing through the Bosporus Strait that bisects Istanbul. See, Andrew Neff, Global Insight, Washington, DC, Where business meets geopolitics, in / Global Agenda, London, May 25, 2005.
21 See, Askari Hossein, Caspian oil development: The sooner the better, Bussiness Economics, 2003, Apr, p:43.
22 Russia wants to export more oil in China and Japan by Angarsk-Daqing line, see, Arvedlung Erin, Russian Oil Company Says Profit Is Up 26%, The New York Times, 2003, Oct 23, p:2, and Changwei Pang, Diplomatic Games for oil, Beijing Review, 2003, Oct 9, p:40.
23 Faryanegan M R, Iranian option most economically viable for exporting Caspian oil, Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 2003, Mar 217, p:22.
24 See, True Warren, A new pipeline era, Oil & Gase Journal, 2003 Jun 30, p:17. Also, see, Ignatova Maria, On your pipeline or under it, Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 2003 May 14, p:17, Lee Julian, FSU oil exports through Iran set to incresase, Oil & Gas Journal, 2003 Ap 7, p:68, Farzanegan M R, Iranian options most economically viable for exporting Caspian oil, Oil & Gas Journal, 2003, Mar 17, p:22.
25 See, Anonymous, Quick takes, Oil & Gaz Journal, 2003, Nov 17, p:8.
26 See, Webster Paul, Russian dream, Canadian Bussiness, 2003, Feb 17, p:46.
27 See, McFarlane Robert, East of the Oder: Save Ukraine From “Mother Russia”, The Wall Street Journal, 2003, Oct 13, p:19.
28 Butrin Dmitry, Gazprom protects Russian gas pipelines, Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 2003, Sep 24, p:24.
29 See, MacFarlane Neil, Is it catching, Worls Today, 2004, Feb 24, p:14 and, Cooper Christopher, Georgia Caught in US-Russian Pull, The Wall Street Journal, 2004, Jan 26, Sec:A, p:13, and Boese Wade, Russian Withdrawal from Moldova, Georgia Lags, Arms Control Today, 2003, Dec, p:43, Gordiyenko Anatoly, Baikova Yelena, Washington doesn’t dictate, it just recommends, and ask you to take dictation, Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 2003, Jul, p:18, Baikova Yelena, Gordiyenko Anatoly, Georgian wedge between Russia and the US, Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 2003, May 14, p:22..
30 Anonimous, Georgia Vote for Landmakers in Preview of a Presidential Race, The New York Times, 2003, Nov 3, Sec:A, p:3.
31 Nabucco Gas Pipeline, Time schedule
Environmental Assessment Study 2005 – Mid 2006
Construction phase Mid 2006 – End 2009
Start of Operation End 2009.
32 Nabucco Gas Pipeline, Figures
Length of the Pipeline appr.3,400 km
Total capacity T urkey 25 - 30 bcmy
Expected offtake in Transit countries 8 - 10 bcmy
Total capacity to Austria Baumgarten 17 - 20 bcmy
Total Inves tment for plateau level 4.4 billion EUR.
33 Reasons:
- Cost competitiveness vis-a-vis other newprojects
- Large gas fields in Central Asia/ Middle East
- Supply diversity – relative to already linked sources
- Nabucco partners take-off gas to partially meet their future gas demands.

- assistant professor at University “Lucian Blaga”, Sibiu.




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