Introduction

Up to the 1999 reform, the implementation of Structural Funds in England was carried out by central government departments and the involvement of the regional actors in the implementation process was practically non-existent (Bactler and Turok, 1997). Since the regions lacked any kind of power, the governance of the Structural Funds in England was often identified with multi-level participation, with the Government acting as an extended gate-keeper (Bache 1998, 1999).

Two factors challenge this interpretation. Firstly, the devolution process is in continuous development. It is questionable whether the balance has in the meantime shifted from multi-level participation towards multi-level governance (MLG) and just what potential these structures can develop. Secondly, Hooghe and Marks (2001) argue that MLG exists in two types and, what Bache (1998, 1999) calls multi-level participation, seems now to resemble Type I MLG.

This paper takes further these observations and assesses the governance of Structural Funds in England. It uses the criteria outlined by Hooghe and Marks (2001) for assessing governance in a political system. These are: the distribution of competences between jurisdictions, the distribution of fiscal power and the structure of formal and informal relationships.

The research results support a new theoretical perspective on the governance of the Structural Funds, particularly in countries like England where it has usually been characterised as intergovernmental. This also has implications for policy-makers, as they re-define the context in which they operate. In demonstrating its claim, the paper first looks at theoretical issues, then at the English regional context and in the end it addresses the research findings.

Multi-level governance

Harmonious development, by reducing the differences among the European regions, has been part of European thinking since the beginnings of the integration process, and represents the target of today’s European Structural Policy. Presuming channelling of European Union (EU) resources towards the most remote regions in the Union, Structural Policy is supposed to reflect the solidarity of the Member States. Politically, however, it has been difficult to distribute the European resources solely according to deprivation criteria. The process of building the ESP as it is today has had ups and downs, and these are reflected in the theory development.

The classical debate between neo-functionalist and intergovernmentalist paradigms did not avoid this policy domain. The creation of the European Structural Policy took place in the moment of political relaxation which followed the Luxemburg compromise (1969)¹. Plans for economic and monetary union (EMU) were put in place and also, the accession of United Kingdom (UK), Denmark and Ireland was about to happen (Bache 1998). But the oil crisis of 1973-1974 delayed the plans for EMU as the economies of the Member States were very much threatened. Added to this, the position of the UK², a potential oil rich country, was decisive in ending the enthusiasm for a united Europe and headed EU governance towards the intergovernmental realm.

In 1975 the first Structural Fund, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), was approved. The specifications of the policy reflected the impasse that marked the political context of the 1970s. As Keating and Hooghe (1999: 224) have stated, “ t he policy was a fiction, a way of dressing up an interstate transfer mechanism as a European policy”.

The project for installing the Single Market and developing the conditions for EMU in the mid 1980s boosted the importance of Structural Policy. As a consequence of the Mediterranean enlargement, the Single European Act (SEA) made special provisions for the new members who were less developed, thus unable to participate in a common market without considerable structural aid. This context was favourable to the transfer of power towards the supra-national institutions and the shift of ESP from a pay-back system to a more distributive policy.

Interpretations of the reform varied. For the liberal intergovernmentalists, notably Moravcsik (1995), the reform represented little more than a compromise, one consciously undertaken by the member states in order to fulfil their interest in building a prosperous common market. Moreover, the transfer of authority was cautiously made in order for the states to maintain control over integration (Nugent 1999).

The neo-functionalists and those generally of a pro-European outlook saw the new changes as proof of the increased power of the European Commission, and as a step towards deeper integration. One of the main achievements of the 1988 reform was the approval of the partnership principle. Partnership meant that sub-national actors should work closer with the state and the EU in order to define the priorities of and to implement the policy in the EU regions. Only the states which applied the principle benefited from Structural Funds. This constrained the states to include actors from the sub-national tier in the governance. The coming together of the regional actors with the national and the European actors was a necessity to effectively implement the funds. This participation of actors from the three levels was the context for the emergence of multi-level governance theory (Marks 1993, Marks and Hooghe 2001, Neyer 2003, Perkmann 1999, Kochler-Koch 1996).

MLG theory opposes liberal institutionalism as it considers both supra- and sub-national institutions determinants of policy-making. It completes the neo-functionalist theory as it considers shifts of power not only towards the supra-national, but as well towards the sub-national levels of governance. It presumes cross-border cooperation³ (Perkmann 1999) and a direct dialogue between supra- and the sub-national actors (Marks 1996, Bache 1999).

MLG has been subjected to criticisms. Firstly, it is argued that history-making decisions are outcomes of intergovernmental negotiations rather than MLG (Peterson and Bomberg 1999). Secondly, according to Bache (1998) it is particularly at the implementation phase that the states manage to interfere and exercise effective control. This is due to the administrative differences among the member states which make it impossible for the Commission to properly monitor the process. Consequently, the states have room to act as extended gatekeepers rather than MLG actors.

Nonetheless, recent research may give a different interpretation to these criticisms. Although MLG is broadly understood as the devolution of state power to supra- and sub-national levels of governance, according to Hooghe and Marks (2003) it has evolved towards two distinctive types.

The first type of governance (Type I) is rooted in federalism. As shown in Table 1, it can be identified through a small number of multi-task jurisdictions, these having mutually exclusive territorial boundaries. The levels of governance are also few in number and there is an element of hierarchy for fulfilling the need for the coordination of policies and thus of effectiveness. The second type (Type II) presumes a vast number of functionally specific jurisdictions. These are flexible and territorially over-lapping. The levels of governance are numerous and intertwined. Here the jurisdictions tend to be organised by functions rather than by hierarchy. These two types co-exist. Whereas Type I is characteristic of intra-state governance the second type “appears strongest at the edges” of the first (Hooghe and Marks 2001). It is located:
• where private and public sectors interact,
• between national and international arenas,
• in cross-border programmes developed by regions of neighbour states,
• and where the local government interacts with com­munity associations.

This new classification in types of MLG which co-exist brings new insights with regards to the validity of MLG in the implementation of the Structural Funds. It can be used as a heuristic device to identify MLG characteristics particularly where the existence of MLG is questioned. Such a case is England. The UK was famous for the strength of the Westminster model⁴ which appeared to make it almost impossible for the regions to get actively and independently involved in supranational decision-making (Rhodes, 1997).

Since 1997 it has had devolution of power. Despite this, some argue that there still is a tendency for the central government to act as a gatekeeper⁵ rather than a MLG actor (Bache, 1999) with England as the most centralised of the four British regions.

According to the findings of this study, England reflects a predominantly Type I multi-level governance in its initial stages. The paper will demonstrate its claim by assessing the governance system for the implementation of the European Structural Funds. For this it will first present the English case, then the research design and finally the data analysis.

The Regional Context

The UK, well-known for its highly centralized administration, now faces devolution of power. This case particularly attracted attention as the country that is in favour of intergovernmental EU, implements MLG. If the transfer of power to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland might have been a sensitive and anticipated response to the pressures coming from these regions and from other bodies of influence, it was far less foreseeable that a similar phenomenon would come into sight within England as it is the most centralized of the four.

In just a decade, since the Labour Party returned to power, the English regions gradually experienced a degree of regional government. These bodies have increasing importance for the distribution and the implementation of the ESP as the latter process is more and more devolved to them. In the region, the system of governance is made up by the Regional Assembly (RA) in some regions, the Regional Development Agency (RDA) and the Government Office (GO) (Table 2). Formally only the latter should represent the involvement of the national government in the region, while the first two bodies should unite and represent the regional voice. The RDA follows to maximize the economic gains to the region and the purpose of the assembly is to ensure the accountability of the RDA. The second function of the assembly is to represent the region to the national government, especially so if and when regional and national interests are at odds.

Table 1: Types of MLG

Table 2: Regional Tier

In terms of the Structural Funds, the GOs are the Managing Authorities for the Structural Funds, so they implement the funds in the region. The role of the government offices is twofold: they represent the government in the region and they represent the regions to the central government and in the interactions with the European Commission.

The RAs and the RDAs sustain a regional office in Brussels through which they lobby the European decision-makers. Their role is significant particularly for their potential in further regionalisation. Consequently at the regional level one can speak of a troika that is continuously accumulating governance competences.

Given the regional structure mentioned above, a preliminary conclusion would be to identify England as part of a MLG system. But there are several criticisms regarding the way these devolutionary measures were implemented. It has been often argued that the central government has preserved veto measures in key areas as well as various mechanisms of control over the regional authorities (Bache 1999, Jeffery and Mawson 2002). Bache (1998, 1999) argues that it seems more appropriate to identify the central government as an extended gatekeeper within multi-level participation rather than an actor along with the regions within a MLG framework.

On the other hand, the devolution process is in continuous development and the findings of this research project challenge some of the criticisms referred to above. Did the balance shift in the meantime from multi-level participation towards multi-level governance? Is England facing a transitional period? And just what are the implications of the type of MLG for assessing the governance of Structural Funds in England.

Structural Funds Governance in England

The research study includes eight of the nine English regions⁶ and uses three types of data sources: interviews, reports and statistics. Before proceeding to the current research the project was piloted in four regions. The respondents are, as in the pilot study, members of European Secretariats of the Government Offices, which are the Managing Authorities of the Structural Funds in England. The second source of data is the implementation documentation. The Single Programming Documents (SPDs) of the regions can give information about partnership structures, monitoring committees and the distribution of responsibilities. The other source is represented by the Mid-Term Evaluations (MTEs). These are assessments of the extent to which the targets have been fulfilled, the management capacity and the functioning of the partnership. Thus, to a certain extent they can give information about the purported MLG structures. The regulations concerning the monitoring of the structural funds demand that the assessors be independent, this ensures the objectivity of these sources.

The research is also backed up by the use of statistics. These concern particularly two aspects of the MLG, namely lobbying and bargaining and broadly reflect whether only the criterion of ‘need’ is followed, or there are other interests that mark the distribution of funds.

The analysis uses the criteria suggested by Hooghe and Marks (2001) for assessing the existence of MLG. These are:
- the distribution of policy competences across jurisdictions;
- the distribution of fiscal power
- the structure of the formal and informal relationships among the jurisdictions.

1. Distribution of policy competences
One of the characteristics of the Type I governance is that there is hierarchical reporting between different levels of governance. Furthermore, the number of jurisdictions increases as the hierarchical order decreases (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). This is the case for England.

There are mainly three layers of Structural Policy governance⁷. At the European level the chief authority is the European Commission who establishes the main directions of the policy, enforces regulations and is the paying authority.

At the national level, two government departments have the role of managing authorities for the Structural Funds: the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) and the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP). These work together with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in the negotiations with the European institutions, particularly with the Commission, in matters that concern the whole or the majority of the British regions.

In implementing the Structural Funds, the competences vary with the objectives (Table 3). Objective 3 activities are managed mainly at the national level and are not of interest in this paper. For Objectives 1 and 2 the Managing Authority competences have been devolved to the regional Government Offices, but the central government departments elaborate regulations for the regions. The regional tier is made up, as mentioned above, by the regional troika: GOs, RDAs and , in some cases, RAs.

Each region has, for Objectives 1 and 2, its Programme Monitoring Committees (PMCs) made up by partners from all levels of governance. Their purpose is to monitor the implementation of the programmes.

The distribution of competences is not equal, but each level of governance has importance and cannot be ignored. It must also be kept in mind that the regionalisation of England is a novel process which is currently developing, so England is facing a transitional period where asymmetries are normal. However, there are strong criticisms which concern at least two issues. These are partnership and the relationship between power-responsibility.

The first critique of MLG (Bache 1999, Bachtler and Turok 1997, Downs 2002, Evans 2000, Evans 2003) challenges the definition of partnership as a close consultation among different partners who are to be named by the member state according to its domestic rules. While this critique might have had some validity in the early 1990s, it is more questionable since the 1999 Structural Fund reform which mandated stronger regional administrative structures.

The empirical evidence confirms the existence of partnership in England and its extension during the 2000-2006 programming period. In the regions, partnership structures, which now include even individual organisations and people, design the SPDs and drive the PMCs. According to the respondents, regional and local partners are also involved in the restructuring of some SPD elements suggested by the MTEs.

However, evidence also suggests that MLG is in process of development in England since partners at the regional and sub-regional level are not always aware of their competences and of the targets of the programmes. Hence, the implementation of the 2000-2006 programmes was delayed due to the need for training for partners and incomplete functioning of some PMCs.

Table 3: Types of eligible regions

The second critique of MLG in England addresses the asymmetry between devolved responsibility and power (Morgan 2002). With one exception, the respondents agreed on the existence of asymmetry in working with partners. They also argued that a shift towards equilibrating the balance by holding all the partners equally responsible would cause a decrease in the interest of some of them- such as businesses- in the process.

Furthermore the fact that Objective 3 is almost entirely managed by the DWP, with Objectives 1 and 2 managed predominantly by the regions, means there is a lack of coordination between the programmes which reduces the synergistic capacity of the structural funds. The variation, with the programmes, of allocation of competences and thus the fragmentation of governance (Vos et al. 2001) also strengthens the argument that in England the emergence of Type I MLG is in its early stages.

2. Fiscal power
Devolution in England is a phenomenon resulting from internal as well as external pressures (for instance, globalisation and ESP reform). Ultimately however, it is a government controlled process as the financial resources and the design of the regional tier is supported and driven through programmes led by John Prescott, the Deputy Prime Minister. It has been argued (Tomaney 2002, Bradbury and McGarvey 2003) that the RDAs and the RAs do not function for the region, but rather they are advocates of Whitehall’s interest in the region as they are financially controlled by the latter.

Some real examples challenge this view. The RAs and some RDAs were officially against the proposed UK government strategy for post 2006 European Structural Policy. It was also confirmed in most of the interviews that there is a very active lobby through their offices in Brussels for supporting the regional view regarding the future of the Structural Funds. This supports the argument for Type I MLG development as the regional interests are officially divergent from the national government’s (Evans 2003), despite the purported financial control.

Furthermore, the RAs, where they exist, have been allowed through the Government’s White Paper Your Region, Your Choice 2001 (Tomaney 2002) to receive a percent of the council tax. A noteworthy fact is that their budget is small in comparison to the national government. As one of the participants argued, this reduces the impact of the former; since power is proportional to resources.

With regards to the ESP, the direct relationship between financial resources and decision-making power represents an issue for the allocation of structural funds. The policy has often been attributed a pork barrel characteristic (De Rynck and McAleavy 1997), meaning that the resources are distributed according to bargaining outcomes rather than specified eligibility criteria. The existence of MLG implies bargaining and possibly an unfair map of distribution. A gatekeeper role of the government would be reflected in a fairer distribution with a tendency to concentration of funds in less developed areas.

This characteristic of MLG will be supported here through comparison of the distribution of Structural Funds and the level of economic development of the regions. The case study will be represented by Objective 2 regions⁸ for the following reasons: First, the programmes which are managed at the regional level are Objectives 1 and 2. From these by far the most numerous are the Objective 2 areas⁹. Secondly, the selection criteria for Objective 2 are not as exact as for Objective 1 (see Table 3) and, consequently there have been opportunities for interpretations and negotiations.

At the European level the distribution of funds between the member states does not follow strict criteria, rather it follows a bargaining pattern (Keating and Hooghe 1999). If the proof of intergovernmental negotiations at the European level is in favour of intergovernmentalists, the unequal distribution among regions suggests a third tier of influence besides the member state and the Commission.

The graphs A and B show that although, in England, there is a tendency for evenly distributing the funding according to the eligible population, nevertheless poor regions like the North East, the North West and Yorkshire and the Humber secure less funding per capita. Two participants from prosperous regions agreed that sometimes richer regions manage to attract more funding than they need, due to more active lobbying. According to 25 percent of the respondents, the wealth of a region may be a positive factor in securing access to financial power.

When considering the GDP indicator there is a tendency for poorer regions to receive more funding. However London which is the second richest area after the South East still gets a considerable amount compared to the latter. And between the South West and Yorkshire and the Humber, although they have similar GDPs, there is a great difference in allocation.

Furthermore, the allocation of funds predominantly to the North of England could be the result of stronger devolutionary tendencies in this part of the country. Morgan (2001) maintains that there is a north/south divide in terms of development and that the northern regions are stronger advocates for regionalism because the further they are from London, the less access they have to policy-making. This interpretation may not be entirely valid since current evidence argues that the public has voted against the RA in the North–East referendum. Some interpretations, however, support the argument that the public voted against a weak RA rather than against regionalisation (BBC).

With regards to the financial allocations within the regions, some respondents observed that the budgetary control is mainly in the hands of the national administration, ensuring less ability to adapt funding to particular regional needs. So, the conclusion here resembles that of the previous section. The core fiscal power remains with the central government. However, the regional assemblies have been given the right to benefit from a share of the local taxes. In terms of Structural Funds regions are still controlled by the state but some regional influences have been identified. These support the argument that England is in the early stages of Type I MLG.

3. Formal and informal relations
The relationships between jurisdictions are of two types in MLG: vertical and horizontal. Horizontal relations are non-hierarchical, while vertical relationships have a low degree of hierarchy in Type I. The hierarchy usually exists just to ensure a coordination of non-overlapping jurisdictions.

3.1 Vertical relationships
The vertical relationships in the implementation of Structural Funds can be both formal and informal. These are hierarchical in the sense that both national government and the European Commission coordinate the process, the latter having slightly more power due to its regulations. The coordination is done through the means of regulations and guidance. Rules are a characteristic of MLG Type I, especially as they attempt to regulate what Hooghe and Marks (2003) called the MLG dilemma. That is that the more the number of actors, the more difficult it is to finalise negotiations and to identify defectors. Thus there is a high risk of free-riding. The existence of a hierarchy however should allow organisation and monitoring.

The side-effects of coordination measures, such as regulations, obviously are present. The EC is mostly criticised for its excessive use of too rigid regulations and bureaucracy, as indeed Whitehall sometimes is. Despite the flexibility of the Commission officers, their activity is very much constrained by the number of regulations that they need to follow. This last aspect confirms the conclusion in the literature that one of the burdens of the Structural Policy implementation is the huge volume of regulations and this suggests Type I governance. The implication here is that the monitoring of funds and the implementation of adjustments pose serious problems due to the inflexibility of the European regulations, such as budget constraints and difficulties in building partnerships.

All respondents agreed that they follow UK rules in addition to European regulations. With regard to the latter, it has been argued that at the national level, the European rules are interpreted and shaped by the ODPM, the chief managing authority according to the national policy targets to which all the regions need to adhere. Such a phenomenon can be interpreted in two ways:
• either it can be defined through hierarchical relations, where each state needs and is allowed to adapt the guidance to its own context - thus Type I
• or the presence of overlapping authorities at the national and European levels - thus Type II governance,

Furthermore, the direct relationships between the regions and the Commission concerning programme adjustments, funding and monitoring can also be evidence in favour of Type II MLG, since the regions have two masters: the Commission (European level) and the Whitehall (national level).

As for informal relations, these are more flexible, especially concerning the channels of access to upper tiers of governance and lobbying.

Regional jurisdictions seem to be building networks of channels of access to decision-making at both the national and European levels. This is obviously an argument in favour of MLG. In five of the eight discussions, the participants agreed that the GOs represent a source of information for the other two regional actors. The GO would also feed the views of the regional actors into the national departments.

With regard to the Brussels Offices coordinated by the RDA and the RA, the GOs use them as a source of information concerning the progress of discussions in Brussels as it can be quicker to obtain the information this way than via national channels. Moreover, the GO in general does not lobby, or if it were to take a position concerning a given issue then that would be through the Whitehall departments which lobby for the structural funds. However, there still are some cases where regional government officers would suggest to the RDA and RA members what to lobby through their office in Brussels. This however, seems to take place in the few regions where the regional partnership seems to be very tight.

The fact that the RDAs and the RAs are new institutions must also be taken into account as they did not lobby for the 2000-2006 Structural Fund framework. Thus they only have lobbied for issues related to its implementation. However they are actively involved in lobbying for the post 2006 programme especially in those areas where they oppose the British government. Unfortunately the value and strength of the regional as opposed to national lobby cannot be appreciated at this moment in time as the post 2006 programme has not yet been approved.

3.2 Horizontal relations
Horizontal relationships have two forms: coordination and competition. Both are less developed than the vertical rapport.

Concerning cooperation, the only type clearly defined is cross-border cooperation, developed through INTERREG III projects¹⁰. These do not entirely depend on the regions as INTERREG III is a Community Initiative so they are hierarchically coordinated.

With regards to inter-regional cooperation in England the only example of cooperation concerned the senior officer level. Here, according to one respondent, the regional officers ask for an increased role of the regional tier in shaping the national position due to the fact that they are better informed about the regional needs. This tendency indicates a predisposition towards devolution within the national government as shifts of power towards Whitehall’s devolved bodies begin to take place. Overall it has been agreed that the English regions do not make as much contribution as they should to policy-making, confirming once again the argument put forward in this study.

As for competition among the regions, although its existence is endorsed by the literature (Keating and Hooghe 1999) it is not confirmed by the empirical evidence cited here. There was an attempt by the Commission to stimulate competition in the allocation of the performance reserve¹¹ to the most effective regions. The interference of the national government was decisive here since it did not agree with the Commission criteria. This can be seen as an attempt to slow down the development of MLG and of regionalisation. Nonetheless the outcome was that everybody received the performance reserve, however with a small variation among the regions.

The structure of horizontal and vertical relationships as well as the distribution of competences is currently exposed to change as the process of regionalisation has not yet ended and the framework for implementing the Structural Funds after 2006 has not yet been agreed. However, it can be concluded that, according to the MLG theory, there are numerous Type I characteristics in the English model. There is a hierarchy between jurisdictions and the number of jurisdictions decreases as the rank rises. There is partnership and cross-border cooperation. There are also attempts to coordinate policies through regulations and these can be seen as attempts to solve the MLG dilemma. These cause effects such as bureaucracy and bargaining which are well known characteristics of MLG. Moreover, the overlapping of Whitehall and the EC in issues such as the allocation of the performance reserve indicates the existence of Type II MLG at the interface between national and international levels. Thus the two types co-exist and the theory is supported through the numerous examples given.

Conclusion

The aim of the study reported here was to give some insight into the implementation of the Structural Policy in England, particularly with regard to the emergence of MLG. The project drew on the study by Hooghe and Marks (2003), “Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance”. This accounts for the existence of two types of multi-level governance, one of them Type I being characterised by low profile hierarchy between the jurisdictions. The conclusion of this paper is that currently England is not characterised by multi-level participation¹² as Bache (1998, 1999) has argued. But it is a Type I MLG in its early stages.

The research used data from interviews, documents and statistics in order to evaluate the presence of MLG characteristics. The evaluation followed the criteria outlined by Hooghe and Marks (2001): distribution of competences; distribution of fiscal power and the formal and informal relations between the actors. Concerning all three categories the findings have shown that Structural Policy governance in England has MLG characteristics, particularly of Type I and that there is potential through the spill-over effect of regionalisation for further progress in this direction. One related conclusion is that the relations between Whitehall and the Commission tend to be non-hierarchical, and these institutions overlap each other in the control of Structural Funds. This indicates the coexistence of Type II MLG at the edges of Type I, confirming once again the position advanced by Hooghe and Marks (2001).

In pursuing this argument the project takes into account that England is a moving target in terms of regionalisation. The implication here is that it is likely that the process will accelerate as the regions develop their capabilities. Furthermore, it is not known yet what the effects of the Eastern Enlargement on the reform of the Structural Funds will be. It remains to be seen whether the governance will be predominantly Type I or Type II.

The main contribution of this paper is that it presents a somewhat different perspective on the English system of structural policy governance. Most of the authors mentioned in the study take the view that Whitehall is a gatekeeper in the implementation of the Structural Funds. This could be because they define MLG strictly with regards to Type II, which presumes non-hierarchical rapport among the actors. Type I however accepts hierarchy and it is argued in this study that England has predominantly Type I MLG characteristics. The few central government attempts at control are interpreted as traces of the former type of governance which was highly centralised. They also support the conclusion that MLG in England is in its early phases.

NOTES
¹ In 1966, General Charles de Gaulle, president of France withdrew France from the EEC due to the increasing influence of the supranational institution. This was seen by de Gaulle as a threat to France’s sovereignty. France returned in the EEC, under the condition that each member state can veto against the EEC decisions, if these are believed to affect the national interest.
² The UK refused to sell oil to the states members of the EEC at a preferential price.
³ It presumes implementation of programmes and strategies by neighbouring regions belonging to different states.
⁴ This model of governance meant that the policies were strongly controlled by the Whitehall, being characterized by the fact that the power was concentrated at the state level.
⁵ The term emphasises that the British government, through its involvement and power over the British regions, actually controls the areas in which the regions are allowed to have direct contact with the European institutions (Bache 1999)
⁶ East Midlands, although it took part in the piloting of the project, did not reply to the numerous attempts to agree an interview date. As interviews represent the major source of data, it has been excluded from the project.
⁷ In some regions, the responsibilities have been devolved to a fourth level: the action plan committees.
⁸ Please see definition of Objective 2 areas in Table 3.
⁹ Objective 1 areas are only three in number.
¹⁰ This is a Community Initiative, a programme developed and implemented strictly by the Commission, targeting small communities in border regions.
¹¹ This represents a 4% ceiling of the funds allocated to the regions and it has been aimed to be awarded after the MTEs are completed.
¹² The difference between the two theoretical views is that multi-level participation implies an extended gatekeeper role of the central government, while Type I MLG argues that hierarchy intervenes just to coordinate the targets.

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Programme Secretariat 1 (2000), Single Programming Document, Objective 2 Programme 2000-2006, South East. Source: The Government Office for the South East.
Programme Secretariat 2 (2000), Single Programming Document, Objective 2 Programme 2000-2006, Yorkshire and the Humber. Source: The Government Office for the Yorkshire and the Humber.
Programme Secretariat 3 (2001), Single Programming Document. North East of England Objective 2 Programme, 2000-2006. Government Office for the North East.
Programme Secretariat 4 (2001), Single Programming Document Objective 2 Programme 2000-2006. South West. Source: the Government Office for the South West.
Programme Secretariat 5 (2001), European Union Objective 2 Programme for the East of England: Single Programming Document. Source: The Government Office for the East of England.
Programme Secretariat 6 (2000), Single Programming Document, Objective 2 Programme, London. Source: Government Office for London.
Rhodes, R.A.W., (1997), Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability. Buckingham: Open University Press.
Tomaney, John. (2002), “The evolution of regionalism in England” in Regional Studies, no. 36-7, 721-731.
WELLS(2003), Mid-term evaluation South Yorkshire Objective 1 Programme. Source: Government Office for the Yorkshire and the Humber.
WEBSITES used for statistical sources of data during June – September 2004:
EUROPA- REGIONAL POLICY INFOREGIO. Available at: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/index_en.htm.

SCADPlus- REGIONAL POLICY. Available at: http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/s24000.htm#POLITIQUE.

THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY- The European Structural Funds. Available at: http://www.dti.gov.uk/europe/structural.html#section1.
THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER. Available at: http://www.odpm.gov.uk/.

ALINA-STEFANIA UJUPAN - Two Bachelors degrees in Politics (Nottingham Trent University, UK) and Economics (Babes-Bolyai University, Romania), a Masters degree in Research Methods for Social Sciences and PhD Student in Policy Studies, School of Policy Studies, University of Ulster, UK.

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