The European Security and Defence Policy from the Strategic Theory Perspective.
A Skeptical View*

SEBASTIAN HULUBAN

Introduction

The September 11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. territory have already changed international relations in significant ways. The only problem is that many policy-makers do not seem yet fully prepared to become aware of these changes. Consequently, it would be probably tautological to assert that it is much more difficult to become aware of the occured changes in allied settings.

For better or worse there are already voices that ask for fundamental changes in the relationship between the transatlantic partners or friends. Robert Kagan (2002) is among the first who advanced challenging and radical views on the consequences of a prolonged transatlantic gap. Much more recently, it has been asserted that the fundamental symbol of transatlantic relations, namely NATO, “is a luxury the United States can no longer justify” (Merry 2003). For Wayne Merry, NATO represents, especially after the end of the Cold War, the symbol of the European psychological dependence on the United States in “the most fundamental area of public policy”, respectively defence. Merry’s solution is, of course, a radical one, “cutting the Gordian knot” like. But probably one should ask whether or not these kinds of solutions are not appropriate sometimes, and especially when one talks about security and defense issues. If we pay a careful look at the conceptual, strategic and institutional ambiguities (Lindley-French 2001) that have surrounded the main developments of European Security and Defence Policy it will seem that sometimes the “or-or” logical operator would work better that the “and-and”¹ one.

The essay is not very ambitious in its goals, namely to advance new and original ideas about how the ESDP and transatlantic security relations should look like in the future. Its main objective is to provide a critical framework for analysing the main developments that took place in the areas of foreign, security and defence policies within the European Union mainly during the last five years. The reason is that “there has been more progress on European security and defense issues since 1998 than in the previous 50 years” (Howorth 2001, 767). A particular focus will be on the latest developments, especially after the events of September 11, 2001. The main argument of the essay is that as long as the EU shows the ambition to develop its own security and defense policies, even armed forces, this evolution should be judged against the most basic principles and frameworks of strategic theory. Defence policy, like it or not, is about procuring, using and managing the so-called “last resort” tools of politics, namely the fighting power capacities and capabilities, men at arms. Thus, by using a broaden framework of strategic theory, the essay will analyze the ESDP from the standpoint of the three fundamental components of fighting power: conceptual, material, and moral². First, a logical/chronological presentation of the CFSP/ESDP for the last twelve years will be provided. The focus will be mainly on the process of institutional building. Then, the latest and most important developments within the ESDP will be analyzed by using the three conceptual lenses mentioned above. The conclusions will come in the end.

CFSP and ESDP after the Cold War

When one looks at the post-Cold War developments in the area of foreign, security and defence policies at the EU level one may ask: why should they bother at all? It is important to stress from the beginning that “being overtaken by events has hardly been a new experience for European leaders in their attempts to forge a collective capacity in foreign and security affairs” (Menon 2004). Thus, the debates within the Inter Governmental Conference preceding the Maasstricht Treaty were “overshadowed” by the beginning of the Gulf War. Second, the period between Maastricht and Amsterdam has shown the obsolence of the progress recently achieved taking into account the wars in former Yugoslavia. Moreover, the famous St. Malo French-British summit did not mean much by the time the NATO military intervention against Serbia in the spring of 1999 began. Last, but not least the events of September 11, 2001 and even more recently, March 11, 2004 in Madrid show more weakness than strategic decisiveness on security issues at EU level.

On the other hand, there are those, especially policy-makers that assert “The transatlantic relationship has been ... pivotal in helping us preserve the freedom, security and democracy we cherish” (Hoon 2004). For some of the European countries, the American military and economic added value in the First, Second, and during the Cold War is fundamental and remains decisive beyond the changing strategic and security environment. In this respect, NATO especially remains not just the winning military alliance of the Cold War, or the American military “toolbox” in Europe for out-of-area operations, but the main guarantee for the transatlantic pluralistic security community. In addition, the Americans did not prove to be very reluctant in paying the biggest part of the Alliance’s bills for the last sixty years.

Origins.

Historically speaking, since the beginning of XXth Century, the Europeans made attempts in developing a supranational military force. For instance, at the end of the First World War, the French Prime Minister, George Clemenceau had proposed to President Woodrow Wilson the idea of multinational military structure as the forced arm of the League of Nations. At the end of the Second World War, some of the Western European countries signed the Dunkirk Treaty of 1947 and the Bruxelles Treaty of 1948. The last one is currently considered as the trigger point of the debates regarding autonomous European secuirty and defense structures. Nevertheless, it is interesting to emphasize that the French-British Treaty of Dunkirk was signed at a time when the two governments “were uninterested in the notion of European Union”, but just to deter against future German agression (Aybet 2001, 59). The argument receives more consistency when we attempt to analyse the possible causal relationship between the development of a European Defense and Security Policy and European integration (Howorth 2000). In other words, is the ESDP just a funtional spillover provider for further integration, probably the most important (Ojanen 2002), or the ESDP rationale should ultimately rest on deterring existing threats and risks?

The Brussels Treaty lost from its impetus when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 in Washington D.C. Thus, for the next forty years, “the European Community essentially remained a nested organization that was in practice protected by NATO, and by states’ own defense regimes” (Heighton 2002, 722). The main developments during the Cold War were limited to the European Political Cooperation (EPC), the eventual failure of the Fouchet Plans in 1962, and the “half-life” status of the Western European Union (created by the enlargement of the Brussels Treaty).

The early 1990s.

The end of the Cold War came at a time when the most important decisions in terms of further European integration were made. The Maastricht Treaty signifies the moment when the EPC was reformulated and, furthermore, it received the status of a pillar in the restructured Union and a new name, the CFSP.

The question regarding the reason behind building up such a new structure - in both political and institutional terms - would remain probably unanswered without taking into account the security uncertainties surrounding the first years after the Cold War (Keohane and Nye 1993). The collapse of the Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany, the Yugoslav tragedy, the Gulf War and the coming of the first prospects regarding the repositioning of the US global interests all contributed to the creation of the CFSP (Nugent 2003, 416). As Wallander and Keohane show, the end of the Cold War brought, in security terms, an end to the era of direct and clear threats and the beginning of an era of diffuse and intangible risks. In other words, “uncertainty provides a generic reason for establishing security institutions” (Wallander and Keohane 1999, 31). In addition, security and defense policies are not probably the most important parts of public policy (Merry 2003) but they are somehow peculiar in their content because of what has been called “the security dilemma” (Jervis 1978). Thus, “security arrangements may be designed not only to cope with security threats, as are classic alliances, but also with security risks. Because the means to deal with these different security problems vary, we would expect institutional forms to vary as well ... Institutions meant to cope with security risks will have rules, norms, and procedures to enable the members to provide and obtain information and to manage disputes in order to avoid generating security dilemmas.” (Wallander and Keohane 1999, 25-26).

On the other hand, it is probably not so important to be concerned with why the CFSP has had been created at all, but about why it was created as it did. The Maastricht Treaty provided the first institutional ambiguities by spreading, for instance, the external activities of the Union (trade, development cooperation, enlargement, foreign and security policy) across the first two pillars. The situation became even more complicated after September 11, 2001 when the third pillar became also fundamental in the fight against terrorism³ and cosenquently for the common security and defense policy.

Beyond this lack of clarity in institutional design, the CFSP brought some positive significant developments. Thus, a set of general objectives in terms of common foreign policy, instruments of foreign policy such as common positions and joint actions (by unanimity), and the insertion of security issues, “including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defense” were all introduced. At the same time, the WEU received a new impetus by being “frequently projected as the ‘pivot’ between EU and NATO” (Deighton 2002).

EU-NATO relations.

On the other hand, an important development outside the EU context but with important future consequences was the decision taken by NATO to expand itself to the East and Central European post-communist countries. As Anne Deighton shows, during the 1990s there was a competition between NATO and the EU in the areas of membership and enlargement (2002). Although the EU did not engage with the idea of enlargement as early as NATO, one may argue that the enlargement of the EU to the East is probably the most succesful story in terms of common foreign policy.

Moreover, during the first half of the 1990s an intensified cooperation between WEU-EU and NATO took place. First, the basic framework for EU-NATO cooperation has become the European Security and Defense Identity (1996). In addition, a procedural political-military framework has been build under the label of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs).

Moreover, the basic provisions encompassed within the co-called “Berlin +” agreements (1999) set up the framework for the use of the Alliance’s assets by the ESDP in possible future European autonomous operations. However, beyond the famous three D’s (no decoupling, no duplication, no discrimination) presented by the then US Secretary of State Albright the US underlined NATO’s prerogative to have a first refusal on the launching of a EU operation. A very bitter condition, which only added to the weakness and dependency status of the Europeans on US military tololbox.

Making of EDSP

The common foreign and security policy received further impetus by the Treaty of Amsterdam. Thus, policy instruments were extended by inclusion of “common strategies” next to joint actions and common positions, and the provision of enhanced cooperation and extension of QMV were added. In addition, the so-called “constructive abstention” device has been introduced allowing a state not to subscribe to a bounding EU decision as well. In institutional terms, Amsterdam Treaty created the position of High Representative for CFSP as well.

Moreover, a WEU declaration in Peterberg added some flesh on the bones of the CFSP. Thus, by the insertion of the so-called Petersberg tasks within the TEU (Art 17.2), the EU gained a relatively clear framework for military actions such as “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”. It is relatively obvious tthat hese types of missions were tailored with an eye on the events in former Yugoslavia, even though they were not fully used when necessary. In this regard it is also important to emphasize that the 2003 Constitutional Treaty (Art. 40.1) brings important changes in defining the military missions the EU may pursue: peacekeeping, conflict prevention amd strenghtening international security. In addition, the Constitutional Treaty explicitly mentions that these new missions, broadly defined, may be undertaken outside the area of the Union. Although, it still remains questionable why the Peteresberg Tasks were inserted within the TEU as long as between 1992 and 1997 the Union showed to be unable to make use of this framework in former Yugoslavia for instance. Moreover, it would be more interesting to analyze further why Petersberg tasks, given their obsolence, are still in place after September 11.

The Treaty of Nice “further strengthened” the potential of CFSP (Nugent 2003, 417). For instance the “enhanced cooperation” received clarity by signifying the decisiveness of some of the EU members to move further alone, and, in addition to advance common positions and joint actions that do not have military implications.

It should be noted that “enhanced cooperation” is actually a treaty label for what media called the Directoire of the big members (especially UK and France) since the St. Mallo summit. The French-British summit of St. Mallo in 1998 is often regarded as a path-breaking advance towards the ESDP. It is true the summit provided significant political impetus especially in terms of French-British cooperation. Meanwhile, it should be worth to notice the summit represented a common position of the only EU member states capable to interoperable act with the US forces withion the full spectrum of military operations. Thus, as Deighton argues, “The St. Malo initiative was also based on consdieration of the dire deficiencies in the capabilities of the EU and its members that the Bosnian war had exposed” (2002).

After St.Mallo

The St.Mallo summit explicitly called for “appropriate structures” to be established within the EU in order to acquire “the capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces”. It is obvious these ambitious goals required measures to be taken at at least three levels: institutional, military, and budgetary (Howorth 2002). Thus, the Cologne European Council of June 1999 set out the institutional framework, whereas the Helsinki Council dealt with the military dimension. Unfortunately until now there is not a significant and clear cut approach for the budgetary dimension or what has been called the “capabilities-expectations gap” (Hill 1998).

The institutional machinery of the ESDP built since the Cologne summit is of “unprecendented proportions” (Howorth 2001). The legitmate question would be why so complex? Howorth argues that “The muddle which has emerged is the result of a number of incremental or parallel initiatives and a succession of trade-offs between several competing national agendas” (2001). In other words the terrible institutional complexity of ESDP relfects inter-governmentalism at work par-excellence.

Thus, after a short glance at this “monster” at least nine different institutional bodies may be identified: the General Affairs Council (GAC), the HR-CFSP, the Political and Security Committee (known universally by the French acronym COPS), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). All of these operate under the aegis of the European Council. Additionaly, the Politically Commitee (emerged out from the EPC), the COREPER (an emerging institutional rival of the COPS), the Council Secretariat, and the rotating Presidency complete the picture. Beyond these nine “intergovernmental” agencies we should add two supranational institutions, namely the European Commission (responsible for external relations and delivery and implementation of CFSP and ESDP) and the European Parliament which is exepcted to provide the necessary democratic oversight for any further military missions and generally over the ESDP process.

Moreover, it should be noted that institutional building “thirst” is far from being satisfied. In a recent paper, Antonio Missiroli and Martin Ortega - two of the most famous experts affiliated with the Institute for Security Studies in Paris, the expertise body of the Council and the HR-CFSP - call for the creation of a European Security Council based on the model of United Nations Security Council. The envisaged ESC should “operate as a steering commitee between the EU Council (which will have an unwieldly 25 members after this May’s expansion) and the future European Foreign Affairs Minister envisaged by the draft constitution” (Missiroli and Ortega 2004).

In the end the complex institutional framework of the ESDP should be tested against the most fundamental requirement of defense policy: the rapid-decision making process. Ultimately beyond political will, decisiveness, and capabilities decisions regarding the use of military force in complex emergency situations as defined by Petersberg tasks (not to mention the fight against terrorism) should be first of all timely. And here probably lies the most important weakness of the institutional monster built in only five years at the EU level. As Anand Menon shows, “Quite apart from whether the EU will manage to fund ESDP, or whether its defense policies will improve or further strain relations with the United States, is the fundamental issue as to whether the Union will manage to take decisions effectively” (2003, 207). Menon identifies three major sensitive points in this regard. First comes the brake of member states’ different opinions over process, substantive issues and the goals of common defense policy. Second, the crucial issue of leadership⁴ at two different levels: lack of a hegemonic leader (such as the US within NATO) and institutional leadership in terms of weight, consistency and expertise. Finally, the issue of culture of decision-making completes the picture. It would be thus hard to imagine how new institutional bodies such as the ESC may solve the difficult issues presented above, especially when they are inspired by proverbial uneffective institutions such as the UN Security Council.

The Components of European fighting power

As it has been argued at the beginning the process of institutional building is not fundamental in understanding the ambitions regarding the creation of an as autonomous as possible European military component. As one of the toughest critiques of an autonomous European military force asserts, “the obsessive preoccupation of west Europeans with the nature of the mechanism they are creating rather than the environment in which it resides could ... render Europe incapable of dealing with those threats when they become truly menacing” (Lindley-French 2002).

It should be emphasized that in the end, the ambition and stubborness of this process of institutional building must be tested against the less common denominator of any strategic military framework, respectively the capacity to deliver fighting power. Fighting power is not just about waging classical war but it is a mix of conceptual, material and moral elements interlinked among them. Institutional building, complex or not, like it or not, is finally fundamental to the future capacity of delivering fighting power in its conceptual, material and moral features.

The conceptual component

The most important recent development in this regard is without any doubt the document A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy (ESS) presented by the HR-CFSP Javier Solana to the European Council of Thessaloniki in June 2003 and approved last December. The document considers the EU as a global player. In terms of threat assessment, the document positions terrorism as the first, “growing strategic” threat to the European security, followed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (“the greatest threat to our security”), regional conflicts (violent or frozen), state failure, and organised crime.

In terms of adressing the threats, especially terrorism, there is no specific military measure, especially among those currently available and related to Petersberg tasks. This is in spite of the fact the document states “In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; ... each requires a mixture of instruments”. Thus, when coming to the main measures identified in adressing the terrorist threat these are all related to the Third Pillar tasks (Justice and Home Affairs): the European Arrest Warrant, an agreement on mutual legal assistance with US, and steps to attack terrorist financing. Should we then understand that regarding the main emerging threat to the European security there is no available mixture of instruments at disposal?

The issue of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is problematique as well. On the one hand the document underlines the importance of strenghtening the IAEA in the spirit of “effective multilateralism” pursued by the EU. On the other hand, the document explictly states the EU “need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate ... Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future (emphasis added).” In this respect an important diplomatic intiative has been undertaken last fall by the foreign ministers of UK, France and Germany relative to the Iranian secret nuclear prgramme. Presented as a successful instance of preventive engagement by effective multilateralism - as contrasted to the tough approach pursued by Americans by preemptive action - the initiative already seems doomed to failure, as a recent report of the IAEA director showed recently (Gordon 2004).

Another important part of the ESS is underlined by “the need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention (emphasis added)”. As it has been shown, the issue of a European strategic culture is fundamental if the ESDP is “to be anything more than hyperbole or unfulfilled commitmments” (Cornish and Edwards 2001). It is though prolematique whether this kind of strategic culture is already developing through a “socialization process considerably accelerated by the institutional arranegements put in place in the EU” (Cornish and Edwards 2001). The main danger here is similar with the “semantic, quasi-theological disputes on matters of post-structure and substance” that already affected the process of European construction generally (Menon 2003, 212). The debates over issues such as the European security defense identity (Aggestam and Hyde-Price 2001, Hyde-Price 2001), the European “civilian power” (Bull 1983), soft power, and European strategic culture are welcomed as long as they do not create strategic confusion that may further overshadow the material component and, more importantly, affect the moral one. As it has been argued, “European defence sits trapped between engaged and disengaged concepts of security, reflecting a profound strategic confusion within Europe over the objectives and methods of its security and defence” (Lindley-French 2002).

The material component

The material component refers mainly to the instruments of deploying, sustaining, using and extracting military forces in and from the theaters of operation. It is dealing with the operational and tactical deployment of military capabilities, but at the same time, it is strongly connected to the conceptual, strategic component, which ultimately should remain political.

The most important development in the context of ESDP in this regard is the so-called Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999. It required that by the end of 2003, the EU should have been able to deploy - within the framework of Petersberg tasks - 60,000 troops, within 60 days and sustainable for a year. One-year sustainability means actually 180,000 troops (by taking into account a six-monts cycle for rotation). In addition, the civilian assets envisaged at the Feira European Council encompass 5,000 police officers for international missions similar with Petersberg tasks and 1,000 police officers deployable in 30 days.

The Headline Goal has been supported by two important conferences on military capabilties in 2000 (Capabilities Commitment Conference) and 2001 (Capabilities Improvement Conference). A further European Capability Action Plan was also initiated. In addition, the Constitutional Treaty envisages the creation of a European Armaments Agency that should foster developments in the areaof R&D and avoid duplication among the EU member states in terms of defence investments.

It should be noted that in spite of this capabilities improvement initiatives the EU military potential is largely behind that of the US and the operational quality of a future EU full operation is still questionable, especially at the higher level of Petersberg requirement which is considered similar with the operational intensity of the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 (Howorth 2002). As David Yost puts the argument forward, “Basic obstacles have proved difficult to surmount: a lack of political cohesion and unity in Europe, an absence of a shared vision of strategic requirements, and an unwillingness to spend more than minimal levels on military capabilities” (2003, 101). In other words, the material and conceptual components are significantly interlinked.

More recently, the European Council of December 2003 took notice of the serious delays within the framework of the Headline Goal 2003 and it advanced a new Headline Goal of 2010. A new framework has been launched by a joint British-French-German initiative. Labeled as the Battle Groups concept, the new initiative aims to create rapidly deployable multinational military groups (each group should have the size of a batallion, namely around 1500 soldiers) for Petersberg like and hard military operations (including special mountain and desert troops). It is interesting to see whether in the end these battle Groups will be operationally interoperable with the new NATO Response Force for instance.

The moral component

One of the most important statements made at the St. Mallo was actually an appeal to “credible military forces”. Thus, beyond the tangible issues regarding the conceptual and material components of any fighting power there are significant intangible, or subjective elements that lay at the core of any military operations.

These “intangibles” refer to issues of loyalty, motivation, credibility, chain of command, “being under command” and so on. An important element in the study of the moral component of fighting power is historical, namely the use of experiences of the past. As Patrick Mileham argues, “Our understanding of modern military motivation has almost certainly diminished since the major conflicts of the twentieth century. Our re-learning process now must be based on multidisciplinary analysis of great breadth asa well as depth, discarding nothing that we can observe or even imagine”(Mileham 2001).

For instance, the most famous tragic story of a multinational army whose high quality “intangibles” remained famous in military history is the Imperial Army of Austria-Hungarian Empire during the First World War. Thus, despite the ascension of nationalist, xenophob, and chauvinistic feelings throughout the Empire after 1848, between 1914-1918 the KuK Armee mobilized under its multinational flags almost eight million officers and oldiers. The number of losses in four years exceeded seven million human lives (Keegan 1999). It is still hard to imagine nowadays why did these “multinational soldiers” fight to the end in such a manner, especially when one takes into account the serious weaknesses and shortages in the conceptual and material components of the Habsburg military fighting power. It is only the moral component that may offer a credible explanation.

It is obvious how deficiencies in the material component may affect the motivation, morale, and loyalty of troops in combat or just in training. It should be also relatively clear that conceptual and strategic confusion in terms of orders, missions, chain of command and leadership may strongly undermine the moral component. In the end the dilemma relative to the troops trained under the aegis of ESDI and ESDP are similar with those asked by Mileham: “Will they fight and will they die?” (2001). In other words, will there be a real European identity that motivate and create loyalty for the European servicemen and servicewomen to fight in combat? Failures such as those in Rwanda in 1994 or Srebrenica in the same year are still waiting for clear answers in order to avoid future catastrophes that may inflict fundamental damages on any future defence initiatives at the EU level.

Among the intangible, qualitative factors that may constitute a future agenda for ESDP the first coming to the mind is the issue of military institutionalization in terms of professional or conscript armies. For instance countries such as Germany and Greece will probably remain reluctant in changing the conscript system for the foreseeble future, whereas other countries have already moved earlier (UK) or recently (Spain, Italy) to professional forces. Second, different types of military institutions create different cultures. How will the conscript and professional military cultures interact in future EU operations? Third, the issue of military contract and the rules of engagement for the future European rapid reaction forces should be clarified. An important factor in this respect will be played by the conceptual component as well. Petersberg tasks or other future types of missions should be made as clear as possible for those that are supposed to implement them in combat.

Last, but not least is the issue of credibility of ESDP for the military personnel. By contrast, NATO has already developed a sense of loyalty by the very successful result of the Cold War and the various military operations undertaken since then. The question is on what base will the European defense identity be forged? Unfortunately, within the moral component of the fighting power the issue of duplication may not work.

Conclusions

As asserted in the Introduction, the main goal of the essay is not to bring a radical new approach in the analysis of the last twelve years developments of a common foreign security and defence policy for the European Union. Secondly, the essay did not attempt to join the significant number of voices that have criticized the EU leaders’ attempt in developing an autonomous military and security component apart from NATO (Coker 2004, Menon 2003, Russell 2003, Sangiovanni 2003). The goal is rather modest, namely to analyze the ambitions of creating an ESDP as fighting power capacity along three fundamental dimensions: conceptual, material, and moral.

A critical evaluation of the last twelve years of institutional building has been provided by the insertion of major developments within the Treaties (Masstricht, Amsterdam, Nice, and the Constituional Treaty), the European Council or bilateral summits. The answer the essay provides to these developments is that the “institutional monster” created in the last five years may affect, if not seriously amended, the conceptual, material and moral dimensions of any future European military undertaking. The uncertainties and ambiguities of the international environment required new security forums and institutions. The issue the essay underlines is the security insitutions should not follow the ambiguities and uncertainties found in the security environment.

Moreover, the essay attempted to demonstrate it is not only the institutional ambiguity that may affect future European military missions. The design of intelinkages between the three components may have also serious consequences. The linkage between conceptual and material components is relatively clear because both dimensions have significant quantitative elements. In addition, from a military strategic point of view, there is a relatively stable connection between the strategic and operational/tactical levels.

On the other hand the influence of the conceptual and material dimensions on the moral one are not even taken into account up to this moment. As Mileham argues “There is, however, practically no research which assists in educating military commanders on ethos and morale. Most political leaders in Western nations have no education in such subjects at all. Military leaders are often too shy to tell them, or ignorant themselves” (2001). A careful consideration to the moral dimension is more than necessary because the consequences of a possible failure of a European autonomous military mission may be critical for the future. The EU can still afford to have delays in the material dimension or ambiguity within the conceptual one whereas a failure in the moral dimension may be devastating.

* The article is based on the research undertaken within the Chevening Scholar Program 2004 at the European Research Institute, University of Birmingham. I want to express my thanks to Professor Anand Menon for the fruitful support provided both before and after the paper has been completed.

NOTES
¹ I use the “or-or” and “and-and” logical operators to describe the almost 60 years long struggle within the member states of the EU between creating a separate or a non-duplicating defence policy from NATO and the US.
² The approach is borrowed from the current British Military Doctrine. The three components were first advanced by Field Marsahll Sir Nigel Bagnall and his famous “Ginger Group” at the end of the 1980s. I chose this rather “national” framework for the simple reason it covers at a general level the most important strategic components of any fighting power. In addition, this three-level approach offers and interdependent perspective among the levels.
³ As the March 11, 2004 terrorist attacks in Spain showed, there is a significant lack of intelligence cooperation among the EU member states. Unfortunately, the discussions regarding an Euro-intelligence structure were allocated to the Third Pillar, Justice and Home Affairs, rather than the second one. The risk of a new cacophony is evident.
⁴ For an interesting account of the crucial importantce of political leadership in war times see Eliot A. Cohen (2003) analysis. Not surprisingly, the book is one of the President’s George W. Bush favourites.

REFERENCES
Aggestam, Lisbeth and A. Hyde-Price (2001) Security and Identity in Europe. Exploring the New Agenda. London: MacMillan.
Aybet, Gulnur (2001) The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation, 1945-91. London: Palgrave, MacMillan.
Binnedijk, Hans and Richard Kugler (2002) “Transforming European Forces” Survival, 44(3): Autumn, pp. 117-132.
Bull, Hedley (1983) “Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms” in L. Tsoukalis, ed. The European Community: Past, Present and Future. Oxford University Press.
Cohen, Eliott A. (2003) Supreme Command. New York: Free Press.
Coker, Christopher (2004) The ESDP: A Threat to the Transatlantic Alliance? unpublished manuspript.
Cornish, Paul and Geoffrey Edwards (2001) “Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: the Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture.” International Affairs, 77(3), pp. 587-603.
Deighton, Anne (2002) “The European Security and Defence Policy.” Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(4), pp. 719-41.
Eliassen, Kjell A. ed. (1998) Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union. London: SAGE.
European Council (2003) A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy. Brussels, 12 December.
Gordon, Philip H. (2004) “More Sticks, Europe!” Die Zeit, March 18.
Haftendon, Elga, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander eds. (1999) Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hill, Christopher (1998) “Closing the Capabilities-Expectations Gap” in J. Peterson and H. Sjursen, eds. A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? London: Routledge, pp. 18-38.
Hoon, Jeff (2004) Transatlantic Relations, Munich: Speech by the Secretary for Defence at the Munich Security Conference, February.
Howorth, Jolyon, and Anand Menon (1997) The European Union and National Defense Policy. London and N.Y.: Routledge.
Howorth, Jolyon (2001) “European Defense aqnd Changing Politics of the European Union: Hanging Together or hanging Separately?” Journal of Common Market Studies, 39(4) Nevember, pp. 765-89.
Howorth, J. (2002) “The European Security Conundrum: Propspects for ESDP after September 11, 2001” Paris: Groupment D’etudes de Reserches Notre Europe, Policy Paper No. 1, March.
Howorth, Jolyon and John T.S. Keeler (2003) Defending Europe. The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy. London: Palgrave, MacMillan.
Jopp, Mathias and Manna Ojanen.eds. (1999) European Security Integration. Implications for Non-Alignment and Alliances. Ulkopoliittinen instituutti & Institu fur Europaische Politik & WEU Institute for Security Studies.
Keegan, John (1999) The First World War. London: Pimlico.
Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye (1993) “Introduction: the Ened of the Cold War in Europe” in R.O. Keohane, J.S. Nye, and Stanley Hoffman, eds. After the Cold War. International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Lindley-French, Julian (2002) “In the Shadow of Locarno? Why European Defence is Failing.” International Affairs, 78(4), pp. 789-811.
Menon, Anand (2003) “Why the ESDP is MIsguided and Dangerous.” in Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, eds. Defending Europe. The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy. London: Palgrave, MacMillan.
Menon, Anand, forthcoming (2004). “The Foreign and Security Policies of the European Union” in Maria Green Cowles and Desmond Dinan, eds. Developments in the European Union.
Merry, Wayne (2003) “Therapy’s End: Thinking Beyond NATO” The National Interest, Winter, pp.
Mileham, Patrick (2001) “But Will They Fight and Will They Die?”, International Affairs, 77(3), pp. 621-9.
Missiroli, Antonio, and Martin Ortega (2004) “Europe Needs Its Own Security Council”, available at www.syndicateproject.org
Nugent, Neill (2003) The Government and Politics of the European Union. London: Palgrave, MacMillan.
Ojanen, H. (2002) “Theories at a Loss? EU-NATO Fusion and the ‘Low Politicisation’ of Security and Defence in European Integration”. UPI Paper 35/2002. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs.
Russell, Richard L. “NATO’s European Members.” Naval War College Review, LVI (1), Winter, pp. 30-40.
Sangiovanni, Mette S. (2003) “Why a Common Security and Defence Policy is Bad for Europe. “ Survival, 45(3): Autumn, pp. 193-206.
Scweitzer, Yoram (2004) “Another Deadly Call for Europe”, Tel Aviv Notes, No. 101, March 15, Tel Aviv: Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies.
Stevenson, Jonathan (2003) “How Europe and America Defend Themselves”, Foreign Affairs, March/April.
UK Ministry of Defence. Army (2000) Soldiering. The Military Covenant, vol.5, pp. 1-3.
Wallander, Celeste A., and Robert O. Keohane (1999) “Risk, Threat and Security Institutions” in Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane and Celste A. Wallander, eds. Imprefect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
White, Brian (2000) Understanding European Union Foreign Policy. London: Palgrave MacMillan.
Yost, David (2003) “The U.S. – European Capabilities Gap and the Prospects for ESDO.” in Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keller, eds. Defending Europe. The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy. London: Palgrave, MacMillan

SEBASTIAN HULUBAN - Master in Politici si Politici Economice ale Societatilor Post-Comuniste (Universitatea Central Europeana, Budapesta), Master in Relatii Internationale (Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, SUA). A absolvit programul Cheneving Fellowship in Studii Europene (Universitatea Birmingham) in 2004.

 sus