| 
            Politică și societate 
 
            			Just how tabloidized is tabloid press?Personalization, sensationalism and negativism in the 
						coverage
 of the Romanian presidential elections, 2009
 
 
						FLORINA CREŢU1[National School of 
						Political and Administrative Science]
 
							Abstract:The problematics of the public sphere, as 
							firstly outlined by Habermas, has triggered many 
							reflections concerning the metamorphoses in 
							political communication. In this regard, one of the 
							most prominent phenomenona approached in the 
							established literature of media transformations 
							refers to that of tabloidization. According to 
							different scholars, not only are journalistic 
							discourses heading towards a tabloidized style of 
							reporting, but also these practices tend to hinder 
							the creation of public spheres. The present study 
							wishes to understand the relation between these two 
							assertions and empirically, to test their validity 
							on the Romanian tabloid media. Particularly, it aims 
							at exploring whether the tabloids’ news coverage of 
							the last presidential elections meets the general 
							standards of what is called „tabloidization”; and if 
							so, how this may affect our definitions of the 
							public sphere.
 
							
							Keywords: trends in political communication; 
							personalization and sensationalism of tabloid 
							discourses; negative reporting; Romanian tabloid 
							media    1. Introduction: the public sphere and the page 5 
syndrome   Habermas’ first work on the public sphere and „the 
commodification” of the public realm2 
has initiated different perspectives, concerning both the meanings of this 
concept3 and the transformations 
it signaled4.
 The commercialization of political communication, as this process has broadly 
been coined by scholars, has been the subject of ample research and was given 
many names in the established literature. From „Americanization”5 
to „mediacracy”6 and 
„tabloidization”7academics have 
tried to designate, one way or another, the changes occurring in the media 
coverage of political events. Generally, they referred to an allegedly growing 
journalistic style that values sensationalist discourses, a particular focus on 
the personality of politicians, as opposed to policies or political programs, 
and a negative trend of reporting. Supposedly, this would result in citizens’ 
apathy towards politics8, a 
general „dumbing down”9 and the 
dissolution of certain democratic values, as we know them.
 
 The overwhelmingly pessimistic view over these changes in political 
communication has developed to the extent where different journalistic genres 
were classified as being or not part of the public sphere10. 
This was particularly the case of tabloid and tabloidized media, considered idle 
for everyday opinion formation, through their playful and brief style of 
reporting11. We find this type 
of approach not only sterile in our understanding of media dynamics, but also 
narrow, in what regards the definitions of tabloidization and the public sphere, 
generally. How can these concepts be defined? Is there a general 
trend of tabloidization? And if so, does this necessarily involve a 
dissolution of the public sphere? These questions will represent the 
landmarks of this paper. However, answering them requires a deeper understanding 
of the broader context they stem from, that of mass-media commercialization and 
its associated processes. Thus, the next section of this study will try to 
address this issue.
 2. The mediated public sphere: structural transformations in political 
communication
   The public realm’s colonization by the entertainment industry 
represented one of the first statements that defined both the transformations 
occurring in the public sphere and the eloignment from its normative ideal. 
Thus, originally, the public sphere was understood as „the sphere of the 
individuals that gather as a public”12, 
a rational, deliberative space of engagement between citizens and public 
authorities, designed to reach the common good. According to Habermas13, 
the current public sphere, represented by political journalism, lacks a certain 
sense of rationality, sobriety, objectivity and deliberative potential.
 Generally, this approach of the evolution of political communication has 
generated endless debates concerning the media’s role in contemporary 
democracies, and especially that of television. Although the various points of 
view expressed in this regard stress on distinct perspectives, they converge in 
the following postulate: because the media represent our main sources of 
information and interaction with the political world, they represent the public 
sphere. In this context, they are seen as placing themselves in the center 
of political processes, shaping the public agenda14 
and even the practices of political institutions15, 
generating what is called a „mediated public sphere”16.
 
 Thus, some authors have taken the Habermasian stand, affirming that by using 
sensationalist discourses, influenced by popular culture elements, the quality 
of modern journalism has seriously diminished17. 
Allegedly, the result of this would be the decline of civic involvement18 
and the rise of political cynism19.
 
 Before we proceed at discussing the effects of the „new political 
communication” upon citizens, we deem necessary to highlight the way 
commercialization is understood in the light of the abovementioned theories.
 
 Thus, this phenomenon is considered a product of two different processes: 
first of all, under the pressures of market imperatives, the birth and 
development of private televisions, media instances have started to include in 
their programming an increasing number of entertainment shows20. 
That is why various scholars have ascertained the emergence of journalistic 
genres tributary to popular culture like talk-shows, lifestyle magazine 
television and those pursuing private experiences, testimonials. In this 
context, authors like Adorno, Horkheimer21 
and Mehl22 speak of a culture 
of commodification and emotions that would lead to a dissolution of the 
boundaries between the public and the private.
 
 Secondly, different formats of political communication have started to borrow 
entertainment elements, generating what is called infotainment23. 
As Van Santen has shown, this term has been interchangeably used with that of 
„tabloidization”24. The 
dominant outlook over this trend is that topics such as fashion, sporting events 
and sensationalist facts dominate the media agenda, to the detriment of 
political issues. Furthermore, it is deemed that throughout electoral campaigns, 
political candidates have started to conform to this media logic, promoting 
their image in certain genres considered until recently non-political, such as 
talk-shows or in various informal contexts (shopping, playing the saxophone, 
dancing, etc.)25. This process 
is referred as the depolitization of political communication26.
 
 One of the principles of this strand of literature is that modern press 
provides over-simplified information to the public regarding politics (the so 
called „dumbing-down” effect)27, 
stressing rather on the visual component of political communication and 
generating what is currently called image-bite politics28. 
In other words, the idea underlining this approach is that the political 
information we ordinarily receive is reduced to a fast collage of candidate’s 
pictures.
 
 Moreover, media coverage of electoral campaigns is said to be increasingly 
focused on designating winners and losers, engendering a pretended 
horse-race coverage29. 
Last but not least, by stressing on the personal lives of politicians and 
weighing against their political programs, mediated discourses embolden the 
personalization of politics30. 
All these phenomena have been broadly ascribed to a trend of Americanization 
in political communication31. 
Consequently, the various transformations occurring in political journalism have 
been associated to terms such as „mediacracy”, „spectatorship” or „public 
relations democracy”32.
 
 Thus, the view underlined by this perspective is the following: the mediated 
public sphere represents a space of journalistic problematization that should 
cultivate a rational outlook over political realities, in the detriment of an 
emotional or a playful one. Supposedly, it should also value a certain formalism 
in representing the political world, by stressing on its informational content, 
residing in punctual data about legislative measures and electoral platforms. 
Thus, one of the standards of political journalism is deemed as making citizens 
more interested and informed concerning politics. Otherwise, the possibility of 
fostering an authentic mediated public sphere is seen as questionable, and the 
only reflex it may generate among citizens is considered to be cynism or 
consumerism33.
 
 Obviously, this evaluation of the metamorphoses in political communication has 
been perceived by many academics as quasi-fatalist and sterile as regards to 
understanding these processes34. 
First and foremost, due to the particularities of each media culture, one cannot 
speak of a common degree of commercialization of public spheres. From this 
perspective, in his study of the television programming during the electoral 
campaign in 1994, Brants concluded that the proportion between information-based 
shows and entertainment ones was somewhat balanced35. 
Another finding of his research was that throughout the campaign, the candidates 
turned rather to informative genres such as newscast and current affairs, unlike 
the tendency described by other studies.
 
 Hence, analyzing the changes occurring in political communication requires a 
more nuanced interpretation of the commercialization phenomenon, considering 
also the different cultural variables at play. From this reason, the various 
trends highlighted so far have been explored rather as research hypotheses in 
different intercultural studies36.
 
 As for the effects of this type of political journalism, various authors have 
expressed their disagreement about its’ negative influence on everyday political 
involvement37. Drawing on the 
idea that the changes occurring in political communication also imply both a 
different way of engaging in the public life and of understanding participation 
itself; they argue for a definition of this concept based on citizens’ 
discursive activity, interest, attitudes and meaning-making processes, 
engendered by watching political shows.
 
 Thus, through their symbiosis with elements of popular culture, genres 
containing entertainment elements are seen as having the potential to stimulate 
audiences’ interest, who otherwise would reject political information38; 
to reduce the social distance between politicians and the electorate39; 
inspirit citizen talk40 and 
various reflections concerning politics41. 
Still, the strength of these effects varies from one public to another, 
according to different socio-demographic variables, media consumption patterns 
and political interests42.
 
 Furthermore, by using a playful or even ironic or emotional approach, media 
discourses may provide their publics another opportunity to critically position 
themselves toward communicational contents43 
and may represent forms of resistance against dominant social ideologies44.
 
 From this perspective, the mediated public sphere is perceived as a cultural 
sphere45, and represents „the 
articulation of politics, public and personal, as a contested terrain through 
affective (aesthetic and emotional) modes of communication46”. 
Thence, it embeds popular culture’s and entertainment’s various forms of 
manifestation, that provide for a space of reflection both regarding the inner 
and outer world; allow for a certain sense of identification (like in the case 
of soap-opera characters and their public) and the dialogue with our surrounding 
ones.
 
 Thus, the multiple transformations in political communication are understood 
and evaluated very distinctly in the established literature. Some views have 
signaled the existence of a pseudo-public sphere, of the political journalism 
that values emotions in the detriment of rational reflection, the „private” as 
opposed to the public and images instead of information. Others have highlighted 
the emergence of a cultural public sphere that celebrates particularly these 
elements, and whose manifestations contribute to the reconsolidation of the way 
in which we understand political participation and even politics nowadays. 
Consequently, the different tendencies of „aestheticization”47 
and „emotionalization”48 in 
the public sphere may have distinct effects, that go beyond the classical 
interpretation paradigms of some concepts such as political knowledge.
   
  3. Tabloidisation in the public sphere: drawing the conceptual 
  framework
   As highlighted in the previous part of this paper, the 
commercialization phenomenon has been associated with different processes and 
designations. Among these, the issue of tabloidization stands as one of the most 
prominent, due to its all-encompassing conceptual nature. Thus, this particular 
notion is often connected with all of the abovementioned transformations in 
political communication, such as depolitization, sensationalism, 
personalization, horse-race coverage or focus on popular culture elements49. 
Hence, it has reached a certain conceptual ambiguity, consolidated also by its 
frequent association with broad terms such as „politics as entertainment”50 
and its interchangeable use with that of infotainment51. 
Nonetheless, some themes remain consistent, which will the subject of our 
personal understanding of the concept.
 In the established literature, there seems to be a certain assent regarding 
the fact that tabloidization is a product of one or more of the following 
dimension: a negative reporting of politicians, meant to attract the public’s 
attention52; a focus on 
sensationalist, entertainment-based discourses illustrating unusual events from 
the political world53; a 
particular emphasis on candidates’ private lives or personal character, as 
opposed to public policies or electoral platforms54. 
Furthermore, this type of focus on the private persona is also 
illustrated by the increasing use of visuals to the detriment of informational 
content55.
 
 Thus, tabloidization is deemed as the cause of trends such as negative 
coverage (or negativism), sensationalism and 
personalization (or individualization) in political communication. 
Furthermore, it is perceived as an expanding phenomenon, threatening the quality 
of political journalism, the integrity of public culture, political involvement 
and the health of democratic processes, generally56. 
The pessimistic approach over this alleged orientation of mediated discourses 
raises a number of questions: Is the nature of these effects indisputable? 
Or, in other words, do they necessarily imply a decline of public 
participation and interest in political affairs?
 
 Although throughout the literature the connotations of tabloidization remain 
mostly negative, some academics have argued for a more open-ended perspective 
over this concept. Instead of referring to the benefits of classical journalism, 
as a terrain of the authentic public sphere, different authors claim that, in 
fact, tabloid media may represent an alternative, subversive public sphere57. 
The emphasis laid on private experiences could represent the proof of more 
„deeper cultural concerns”58; 
their playful style of reporting and topics could be a form of challenging 
dominant ideologies59 and a 
way to achieve „a greater imaginative proximity to the lifeworld of the 
audience”60.
 
 Whatever the angle we might chose to adopt in evaluating this phenomenon, its 
evaluation requires firstly that we investigate its degree of prominence in 
certain media contexts. Otherwise, we might be evaluating a binary, distorted 
picture of reality that is less grounded in our everyday media landscape. In 
other words: Is tabloidization a rising process, as presumed by some61? 
Like Esser62, we argue that 
any answer to this question will need to take into account the different 
cultural variables at play, such as the media culture within which journalistic 
discourses unfold and the organizational particularities of each media 
institution. Thus, one of the assumptions that will guide the forthcoming 
empirical undertaking is that each media landscape is marked by different 
degrees of tabloidization, if the presence of such a trend is observed.
 
 So far, this phenomenon has been the subject of consistent research carried 
out in the United States63, 
Western Europe64, different 
studies in China65 and The 
Third World66. However, 
studies in commercialization and, particularly, tabloidization in Central and 
Eastern Europe remain to a certain extent scarce, being limited to a small 
number of studies67. 
Particularly in the case of emerging democracies in East Central Europe, 
where private media institutions have developed later than those in the West, 
the patterns of what one might call „tabloidization” could be less prominent. 
This assumption is also justified by the views according to which, unlike the 
American media outlets, some European media institutions have shown a certain 
„resistance” to commercialization68.
 
 One of the peculiarities in the study of the tabloidization hypothesis is 
that it has mostly been explored by analyzing the tone and narratives of 
„quality”, televised journalism69, 
and to a lesser extent the style of tabloids themselves70. 
Thence, paradoxically, its implicit premises have somewhat been taken for 
granted in the case of „yellow journalism”. We contend that analyzing the 
degree of tabloidization in a certain media culture should also 
consider this aspect, as it would provide for richer, culturally valid 
interpretations of this concept. For example, tabloids in Bulgaria seem to 
focus on public issues, whereas the „quality” media are deemed as growing 
sources of personal, sensationalist narratives71. 
Hence, the idea of tabloidization may need different tinges and ways of 
designating it.
 
 Having in mind also the hypothesis of commercialization resistance in Europe72 
and the potential variability of tabloidization in the Eastern bloc, this 
research will pursue the following question: Is tabloid press nowadays 
strongly tabloidized? Answering this question requires that we underscore 
our empirical focus and personal interpretation of the phenomenon, which is what 
the next section will highlight.
 4. Methodological benchmarks
   As previously outlined, very little research has examined the 
tabloidization hypothesis in Eastern Europe. Particularly in the Romanian media 
landscape, where this question has become more prominent in the last years73, 
only one study has approached this particular phenomenon74. 
However, it considers only the style of televised, televised sports news. Thus, 
Romanian tabloids’ degree of tabloidization remains an unresearched topic.
 The subject of this empirical demarche is represented by the coverage of the 
last Romanian presidential campaign, in 2009. This choice was founded not only 
by the postulate that electoral campaigns are increasingly tabloidized75, 
but also by the fact that this particular political moment has been highly 
controversial. Thus, in this campaign the acts of violence between various 
groups of party members have held the news agenda for some time76; 
verbal attacks of some political leaders have been often broadcasted; current 
president and candidate for the position, Traian Băsescu, has been accused of 
hitting a child during an electoral meeting; and the party supporting him became 
famous after using in their promoting strategy local oriental songs (“manele”) 
with a strongly negative reputation in the mainstream intelligentsia. Last but 
not least, Băsescu’s mother suffered a surgical intervention for breast cancer, 
and his daughter was said to soon announce her wedding77.
 
 Having this type of issues on the media agenda of the 2009 campaign, we 
expected that the local tabloids exploited some of them more than classical 
political topics (such as electoral programmes or current internal issues). 
Thus, one of the hypotheses of this research was that in these 
particular circumstances, the tabloids’ coverage of the 2009 campaign might 
have been the subject of a high degree of tabloidization. Before we proceed 
with outlining our personal understanding of the concept and how such an 
assumption could be tested, we will further detail the focus of this empirical 
study.
 
 Because Traian Băsescu, as current president at that time, and both his party 
and family were frequently mentioned in the media discourses of the last 
campaign, their portrayal in the tabloid press will constitute the center of our 
research. By using the content analysis of references in online articles in 
the period starting from the pre-campaign to the elections; we tried to 
explore the extent to which the tabloids’ coverage of these actors was 
marked by negativism, personalization and sensationalism. A special 
emphasis was laid on how this particular candidate was illustrated in connection 
to his family, party members, campaign events and issues of the current 
government.
 
 By searching for the key-words „Traian Băsescu” and „PD-L” (the supporting 
Democrat-Liberal party) in the archives of the three most visited online 
tabloids in 2009, we first tried to explore the main themes associated to this 
candidate. The identities of these papers and the reasons that lead to their 
choice will be further exposed below. Thus, in the period between October 1st (2 
weeks before the official beginning of the electoral campaign) and December 5th 
(the end of the campaign), we identified 394 articles corresponding to our 
criteria.
 
 Because the period of the electoral campaign was marked by a number of 
outstanding events; such as the economic crisis, the cut-backs in public 
functionaries’ wages, union strikes and political conflicts, they appeared in 
the coverage of Traian Băsescu, as current president.
 
 Overall, the main themes associated to this candidate were excerpted 
inductively and designated as follows: deficits of the present government; the 
candidacy of Băsescu and campaign events carried out by his party; his family; 
the electoral debates; and the alleged aggression of a child. The first meaning 
cluster (“deficits of the present government”), represented a resulting category 
of 4 sub-themes, which were identified as: political conflicts or political 
crisis; strikes, public functionaries’ wage reduction or economical crisis; 
economical and political crisis; accusations of corruption. Thus, these themes 
were coded in SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) and their 
prominence was assessed by means of frequency measurements and crosstabulations.
 
 As the research understood tabloidization as a product of personalization, 
sensationalism and negativism, we tried to explore the degree to which each of 
these processes exist in the tabloids’ coverage of Traian Băsescu. Thus, our 
underlining hypotheses interpreted these concepts as follows:
 
 RH1. If the references concerning Băsescu’s 
allegedly hitting of a child outnumber those concerning 
his campaign events, candidature or presidential position (deficits of the 
government), than the tabloids are a subject of a high degree of 
sensationalism.
 
 Thus, the assessment of this hypothesis considered only the period in which 
this particular event occurred; and is based on the often-mentioned postulate 
according to which tabloid formats favor spectacular events to the detriment of 
public issues or the electoral process itself78.
 
 RH2. If the frequency of references 
concerning the candidate’s family is higher than that of the mentions 
regarding his image as a candidate (campaign events) or as the 
president (issues of the government), then we can speak of a high degree of 
personalization. The assumption is also confirmed if most of the articles 
contain pictures of the candidate.
 
 The formulation of this premise envisaged the plea according to which 
campaigns in the age of tabloidization focus extensively on the personal lives 
of politicians and on the visuals portraying these individuals79.
 
 RH3. The presence of negativism in the tabloids’ 
coverage of Băsescu is confirmed if the overall tone of the most articles is 
unfavorable concerning: him as a candidate (candidacy and campaign events; in 
the televised debates); as the person potentially hitting the child; his family; 
his image as the current president (deficits of current government).
 
 This hypothesis was built considering not only the alleged negative trend in 
the coverage of politicians80, 
but also the fact that some members of this candidate’s family have a rather 
unfavorable image in the Romanian landscape. Thus, his youngest daughter was 
accused of unrightfully occupying a high a position in a local private company, 
earning an unusual high income for it81 
and owing her political career to Traian Băsescu. Furthermore, the 
abovementioned inference took into consideration the fact that the political and 
social events happening before and throughout the campaign were most likely to 
be attributed to the president.
 
 The sheets subject to our analysis were chosen according the highest ranked 
tabloids as number of visualizations in October and November, 200982. 
Thus, Libertatea („Freedom”) occupied the first position, Cancan was the second 
most viewed and Click represented the third. However, as Click did not have a 
database of its previous articles, we proceeded to the next ranked tabloid as 
number of displays, Showbiz.ro. Because this sheet also did not own a personal 
archive of articles, we used the one provided by its host website and brand 
owner, Apropo.ro.
 
 Naturally, because any media institution has a distinct broadcasting identity, 
underlining values and ownership, our methodological undertaking also 
acknowledged the particularities of each online tabloid. Thus, the aforesaid 
hypotheses were tested also on every one of these papers, in order to have a 
clearer view over our findings.
 5.  Findings of the research
 5.1. SensationalismIn what concerns our first hypothesis, that of sensationalism understood as 
the tabloids’ focus on Băsescu’s alleged violence act, it proved to be false. 
The event started to be mentioned as of November 27th until December 5th and in 
this time range it had only 22 references of the total 66 related to this 
politician (SD=0.63). Consequently, its degree of coverage was lower than that 
of the candidate’s campaign events and presidential image, associated with 
various deficits of the government (fig.1).
 
 Fig.1. Overall distribution of 
themes associated to Traian Băsescu, November 27th-December 5th  
 Fig.2. Distribution of references 
within each tabloid concerning Băsescu’s act of violence  
 Fig.3. Libertatea: distribution of 
themes associated to Traian Băsescu, November 27th-December 5th  Nonetheless, some of the campaign events themselves might have represented a 
source of sensationalism, since they illustrated the clashes between different 
party members, the oriental songs used for promoting Băsescu and the various 
attacks addressed to this candidate. Still, in the abovementioned time range, 
this category also included news referring to the opposition’s plans for the new 
government and the incumbent’s course of action if he lost the election. Thus, 
overall, the hypothesis according to which Băsescu’s coverage was marked by a 
high degree of sensationalism, turned to be incorrect. However, its evaluation 
requires that we also consider how each of the tabloids reported this event.
 
 As figure 2 shows, the sheet that mentioned it most frequently was Libertatea, 
followed by Cancan and Apropo (x2(6, N = 66) = 1.386, p < .05). This 
particular sheet dedicated only 34,8% of its total references to Traian Băsescu 
in this time range concerning his alleged aggression of a child (N=46; SD=0.68). 
The majority of the articles focused on the campaign events, electoral debates, 
deficits of the current government and family members, as illustrated in figure 
3.
 
 As for the other two online sheets, Cancan dedicated to this subject 29.4% of 
its total references (N=17; SD=0.47) and Apropo, 33.4% (N=3; SD= 0.57). Both 
followed the overall theme distribution as Libertatea, but without mentioning 
any facts or opinions concerning Băsescu’s family.
 
 Hence, our hypothesis regarding the presence of sensationalism in the 
tabloids’ coverage of this candidate was invalidated. Most of their references 
approached Traian Băsescu’s campaign events, and not his alleged act of 
violence. This trend was also confirmed in the case of each tabloid. Although 
the references concerning this potential aggression outnumbered those 
illustrating various deficits of the government (the economic crisis, the 
cut-backs in public functionaries’ wages, union strikes, political conflicts, 
accusations of corruption); we considered it a result of the long period in 
which these political and social events had been highly broadcasted. Thus, since 
their frequency had already diminished by the time this new controversial issue 
appeared, we did not consider this finding relevant to our analysis.
 
 Fig.4. Overall distribution of 
references of Traian Băsescu, October 1st – December 5th  
 Fig.5. Libertatea: distribution of 
themes associated to Traian Băsescu, October 1st – December 5th  
 Fig.6. Cancan: distribution of 
themes associated to Traian Băsescu, October 1st – December 5th 
 Fig.7. Apropo: distribution of 
themes associated to Traian Băsescu, October 1st – December 5th  
 Fig. 8. Presence of images 
illustrating Traian Băsescu in each of the three tabloids  
 5.2. Personalization
 The second assumption of our empirical research was that if the frequency of 
references concerning the candidate’s family is higher than that of the mentions 
regarding his image as a candidate (campaign events) or as the president (issues 
of the government); then one can speak of a high degree of personalization in 
the tabloid press.
 
 By exploring the candidate’s associations with the categories specified in the 
methodological section of this paper, we found that overall, this hypothesis 
does not confirm. As shown below, the references about Băsescu’s family amounted 
less than those illustrating campaign events or deficits of the government 
(N=394). Because their proportion was very low in the overall coverage of the 
candidate (8%, N=394; SD=0.4), we considered that there was no particular 
emphasis on his private life. Moreover, no other remarks were made about him as 
an individual.
 
 Still, we proceeded at assessing the validity of this presumption by analyzing 
how each of the tabloids portrayed this candidate. Thus, Libertatea, Cancan and 
Apropo have maintained the overall distribution described above, emphasizing on 
Băsescu’s campaign events (48%), and associations with the issues of the current 
government (31%) (N= 282). As illustrated in figures 1, 2 and 3, the references 
about his family remained scarce in the case of each tabloid: Libertatea, 6% 
(N=282; SD=0.5); Cancan, 2% (N=73; SD=0.39); Apropo, 4% (N=39; SD=0.16).
 
 Although under the terms of our framework, the hypothesis of personalization 
was infirmed, this evaluation can be considered somewhat questionable from a 
particular angle. If we consider the higher number of references dedicated to 
Traian Băsescu’s family than that of his participation and performance in the 
televised debates, then this may represent itself a sign of personalization. 
Still, considering the low percentages of both of these themes and the reduced 
number of articles provided by Cancan (N=73) and Apropo (N=39), by comparison 
with Libertatea (N=282), reaching such a conclusion would need wider samples and 
further research.
 
 Fig. 9. Overall distribution of 
positive, negative and neutral references of Băsescu  Another measure of personalization that we introduced into our analysis 
concerned the presence of this candidate’s pictures in most of the articles. As 
figure 8 illustrates, no such tendency was observed in all of the three tabloids 
(x2(2, N = 394) = 49.491, p < .05).
 
 Apropo included in 43.6 % of its articles pictures illustrating Traian Băsescu 
(N=39; SD=0.5), followed by Libertatea, 32.3% (N=282; SD=0.46) and Cancan, 5.5% 
(N=73, SD= 0.22). Hence, since none of the tabloids seemed to have dedicated to 
pictures an essential part of their coverage, we considered that the 
personalization hypothesis was not confirmed in this regard either.
 
 Still, our analysis did not consider the size of the pictures compared to that 
of texts, an element often associated with tabloidization (Franklin, 1997; 
2008). Nonetheless, under the terms of this research, the personalization 
hypothesis does not stand; but would still require an evolutionary approach to 
see whether in the past Romanian tabloids have included fewer pictures in their 
articles.
 5.3. Negativism (negative coverage)The third main hypothesis of our empirical demarche concerned the presence of 
negativism in Traian Băsescu’s coverage. It was assessed by means of the overall 
evaluations provided by the three tabloids and specifically considering: him as 
a candidate (candidacy and campaign events; in the televised debates); as the 
person potentially hitting the child; his family; his image as the current 
president (deficits of current government).
 
 Fig.10. Distribution of positive, 
negative and neutral references of Băsescu in each of the tabloids  Our analysis will outline first how the three tabloids presented him overall, 
and then will proceed at illustrating how they evaluated him in association with 
each of the abovementioned themes.
 
 As figure 9 shows, throughout our period of analysis, it would seem that 
Băsescu was overall evaluated in a negative manner (50,6%), and to a lesser 
extent in a positive (19,3%) or neutral way (30,1%) (N=394). However, if we were 
to divide these categories into negative and non-negative (positive and neutral) 
references, our perspective over his evaluation would probably be different. 
Thus, we cannot claim that, overall, the assessments of this candidate have been 
clearly negative, unless we also explore in what period they occurred and which 
of the tabloids might have influenced this overall trend.
 
 The main tabloids who have had negative references concerning this candidate 
are Libertatea (36,9%) and Apropo (18,5%) (x2 (6, N = 394) = 69.192, p 
< .05). As figure 10 shows, Libertatea was also the sheet that provided most of 
the positive and neutral evaluations of Traian Băsescu, due to its high number 
of articles compared to the other online tabloids.
 
 Before the official beginning of the electoral campaign, the candidate was 
referred at mostly in a negative fashion (37.7%), and to a lesser extent in a 
positive (24.7 %) or neutral manner (20.1%) (N=154; SD=0.99). In this interval, 
from the sub-themes of what we called „deficits of the current government”, he 
mostly received negative references in relation to the theme of strikes, wage 
reduction or the economic crisis (13.6%); and to a lower degree with political 
conflicts (5.8%) and the idea of corruption (5.2%) (x2 (12, N = 154) = 75.043, 
p < .05) Thus, the candidate was framed as the president responsible for 
the economic crisis, which is probably why the references concerning his family 
were so scarce (5,23%; N=154; SD=0.51).
 
 Fig. 11. Overall evaluation in 
connection with campaign events  Furthermore, in this time range, the candidate’s negative evaluations related 
to his family represented only 0,29% of all mentions, whilst the positive ones 
comprised 1%. We attributed this to the fact that the tabloid with the highest 
number of articles, Libertatea, emphasized on the illness of Băsescu’s mother in 
a compassionate manner.
 
 In the electoral campaign period, the overall trend of presenting Băsescu was 
maintained, mostly negative (43.3%) and to a lesser extent positive (26.3%) or 
neutral (22,9%) (N=240; SD=0.87). From the category entitled „deficits of the 
current government”, the main topics he was associated negatively with during 
this time consist of corruption (6.3%) and strikes, wage reduction or the 
economic crisis (5.4%) (x2 (12, N = 240) = 28.932, p < .05) . We also 
found that there is a correlation between how Băsescu is evaluated and his 
association with the deficits of the current government (ρ=.255; ρ>0,01; N=394). 
Thus, the more a tabloid mentions this topic, the more this candidate receives 
negative references.
 
 As for the way in which the current president was presented in connection with 
his family, no negative evaluations exist in the electoral campaign period. 
However, this tendency changes when it comes with how the candidate is 
illustrated in relation to his campaign events. As figure 11 shows, the negative 
references outnumber the positive and neutral ones (N=126). Also, we found that 
there is a significant, yet weak correlation between the way in which he is 
generally evaluated and his assessments, not only in the campaign period 
(ρ=.183; ρ>0,01; N=394).
 
 
 Fig. 12. Types of references to 
the candidate in connection with the televised debates  When designing the categories of our analysis, we considered the televised 
debates a distinct moment of illustrating the candidates, which is why we did 
not include them in the category of the campaigning events. Within the articles 
dedicated to this subject, Băsescu received 52.6% negative evaluations, 26.3% 
neutral assessments and 21.1% positive references, as illustrated below (x2(6, N 
= 19) = 27.932, p < .05). From this perspective, his portrayal would 
not seem to have been marked by negativism. Still, we have to consider that if 
these negative references were added to those included in the campaign events 
category, the resulting image would differ. In this regard, a higher number of 
positive evaluations in connection to the televised debates would have provided 
for an overall balanced image of Băsescu as a candidate.
 
 As for how the tabloids presented this candidate in relation to the issue of 
the alleged child agression, we found that, overall, Băsescu received mostly 
positive references (81,81%, N=22). They were found mostly in Libertatea’s 
coverage of the event (68,42%), followed by Cancan (26,31%) and Apropo (5,27%) 
(x2(9, N = 19) = 35.429, p < .05).
 
 Hence, the hypothesis of negativism is only partially confirmed. While overall, 
Traian Băsescu was evaluated in a negative manner, this assessment varies within 
each of the subcategories we subjected to this analysis and, for some topics, in 
certain periods and tabloids. Thus, the tabloid with the highest number of 
negative references concerning this candidate was Libertatea, followed by Apropo 
and Cancan. Libertatea was also the sheet providing most of the mentions about 
Băsescu
 
 Before the electoral campaign, Băsescu, as the current president, was referred 
at mostly in a negative manner, in relation to the government’ deficits and 
specifically the theme of strikes, wage reduction (or the economic crisis). 
Within this time range, the negative references associated to his family were 
outnumbered by the positive ones.
 
 In the electoral campaign period, the overall trend of presenting Băsescu was 
preserved. Thus, he has been portrayed in a negative fashion, in connection to 
the subject of the economic crisis. This tendency was also maintained in what 
concerns his evaluation as a candidate: the references concerning his campaign 
events are mostly negative and those relating to the televised debates are 
equally negative and neutral. Although we might understand the latter as a sign 
of a balanced assessment, if we were to add the mentions from this category with 
those included in the campaign events category, we would obtain a rather 
negative image of this candidate.
 
 As for the way in which the current president was presented in relation to his 
family, no negative evaluations exist in this period.
 
 In connection to the issue of the alleged child aggression, we found that 
Băsescu received mostly positive references. They were found mostly in 
Libertatea’s coverage of the event, followed by Cancan and Apropo.
 
 Thus, despite the fact that this candidate was mostly evaluated in a 
negative fashion, due to his association with the deficits of the current 
government and the negative assessments he received during the electoral 
campaign, our hypothesis does not fully stand. In relation to 
Băsescu’s family and his alleged aggression of a child, the tabloids have 
illustrated a positive outlook over the candidate.
 
 While it is true that our research drew the gloomiest picture of what one might 
call „negativism”, it did so not only to prove the lack of consistency in some 
academic accounts of tabloidization, but also to highlight the specificity of 
Romanian tabloids. In the terms of our research hypothesis, it is safe to claim 
that tabloids’ coverage of the last presidential campaign was somewhat marked by 
negativism.
 
 However, the reasons that lay behind this negative coverage might exceed the 
boundaries of its commercial rationale. Particularly in the case of the 2009 
campaign, when the Romanian society was starting to manifest its deepest 
concerns about its social and political being in the context of the economic 
crisis, the tendency of evaluating the current president in negative terms 
is, to a certain extent, understandable. Furthermore, considering that 
Băsescu‘s appraisal throughout the electoral campaign was somewhat influenced by 
the different breaches of civility in the campaign itself (clashes between party 
members, inter-party verbal attacks, populist campaigning strategies); its 
negative tone is justifiable, to a certain extent.
 6. Conclusions of the empirical analysis. Discussion
   The first hypothesis of our investigation of the tabloidization 
phenomenon was that if the references concerning Băsescu’s allegedly aggression 
of a child outnumber those concerning his campaign events, candidature or 
presidential position (deficits of the government); than the tabloids are a 
subject of a high degree of sensationalism. 
 Because in the period when this topic appeared on the sheets’ agenda, its 
proportion was lower than all of the abovementioned categories, we considered 
that this hypothesis was not confirmed. Most of their 
references approached Traian Băsescu’s campaign events, and not his alleged act 
of violence. This trend was also confirmed in the case of each tabloid. Although 
the references concerning this potential aggression outnumbered those 
illustrating various deficits of the government (the economic crisis, the 
cut-backs in public functionaries’ wages, union strikes, political conflicts, 
accusations of corruption); we considered it a result of the long period in 
which these political and social events had been highly broadcasted. Thus, since 
their frequency had already diminished by the time this new controversial issue 
appeared, we did not consider this finding relevant to our analysis.
 
 Still, our empirical undertaking did not explore deeper into how the campaign 
events themselves might have represented a source of sensationalism. Since they 
also included references concerning different political initiatives for the 
future, we considered that this category is not one to illustrate such a trait. 
Further research will need to outline if what we have denominated as „campaign 
events” (events happening in the course of the campaign that also include 
parties’ promoting actions) is a category increasingly influenced by different 
sensationalist facts.
 
 The second assumption of our empirical research was that if the 
frequency of references concerning the candidate’s family is higher than that of 
the mentions regarding his image as a candidate (campaign events) or as the 
president (issues of the government); then one can speak of a high degree of 
personalization in the tabloid press. By exploring the candidate’s associations 
with the categories specified in the methodological section of this paper, we 
found that overall, this hypothesis does not confirm. The references 
about Băsescu’s family amounted less than those illustrating campaign events or 
deficits of the government. Thus, the tabloids have emphasized on Băsescu’s 
campaign events and associations with the current government’s deficits.
 
 Another measure of personalization that we introduced into our 
analysis concerned the presence of this candidate’s pictures in most of the 
articles. Since none of the tabloids seemed to have dedicated to pictures 
an important part in their coverage, we considered that the personalization 
hypothesis was not confirmed in this regard either. Yet, fully 
validating such a hypothesis in the Romanian media landscape would require an 
evolutionary approach to see whether in the past Romanian tabloids have included 
fewer pictures in their articles.
 
 Although under the terms of our framework, the hypothesis of personalization 
was infirmed, this evaluation can be considered somewhat questionable from a 
particular angle. If we consider the higher number of references dedicated to 
Traian Băsescu’s family than that of his participation and performance in the 
televised debates, then this may represent itself a sign of personalization. 
Still, considering the low percentages of both of these themes and the reduced 
number of articles provided by Cancan and Apropo, by comparison with Libertatea, 
reaching such a conclusion would need wider samples and further investigation.
 
 In what regards the hypothesis of negativism, this was only 
partially confirmed. Despite the fact that this candidate was mostly 
evaluated in a negative fashion, due to his association with the current 
government’ deficits, specifically, the economic crisis, and the negative 
assessments he received during the electoral campaign, our hypothesis does not 
fully stand. In relation to Băsescu’s family and his alleged aggression of a 
child, the tabloids have illustrated a positive outlook over the candidate. For 
the time being, it is safe to claim that the tabloids’ coverage of the last 
presidential campaign was somewhat marked by negativism.
 
 While it is true that our research drew an extreme picture of the negativism 
hypothesis, it did so not only to prove the lack of consistency in some academic 
accounts of tabloidization, but also to highlight the specificity of Romanian 
tabloids.
 
 The reasons that lay behind this negative coverage might exceed the 
boundaries of its commercial rationale. Particularly in the case of the 
2009 campaign, when the Romanian society was starting to manifest its deepest 
concerns about its social and political being in the context of the economic 
crisis, the tendency of evaluating the current president in negative terms 
is understandable. Furthermore, considering that Băsescu‘s appraisal 
throughout the electoral campaign was somewhat influenced by the different 
breaches of civility in the campaign itself (clashes between party members, 
inter-party verbal attacks, populist campaigning strategies); its negative tone 
is consistent, to a certain extent.
 
 Hence, in the framework of our research design, we can say that the only mark 
of tabloidization in the Romanian tabloid media is that of negativism. Still, as 
we have shown, this trait may be considered somewhat justified by the contextual 
variables that defined the 2009 presidential campaign.
 
 Perhaps a qualitative approach of the language and style used in the Romanian 
tabloids would make for a better instrument for assessing their degree of 
tabloidization. While coding the data, we noticed that some of the headlines 
have made use of various humorous forms (“They had some laughs in the 
[televised] confrontation!”83; 
„The partnership for Timişoara was signed, but the people from Timişoara have 
not resigned [to it]84”). 
Thus, they might represent a sign of what Fiske called „ideological resistance”85. 
Nonetheless, future research in the Romanian tabloid media should explore this 
assumption.
 
 The findings of our research seem to point that there is a certain degree of 
similarity between the Romanian and the Bulgarian tabloids, as illustrated in 
the Media Sustainability Index86. 
As shown in the course of our analyses, the three sheets have dedicated an 
important place to the issues of the current government and have also mentioned 
the parties’ plans for the future mandate. Thus, in the analysis of 
transformations in political communication, it would be interesting to see 
whether there is a specific, Eastern European type of tabloidization; that 
implies an inverse polarization between what is commonly understood as the style 
of tabloids and that of the so-called „quality press”.
 
 So what are the implications of this research for the Romanian public sphere? 
As we have seen, in the terms proposed by our framework, the three tabloids have 
neither been affected by sensationalism or personalization. Their negative 
coverage on some issues can be understood as a healthy democratic attitude 
toward the troubles of the Romanian society and how they are dealt with by the 
national authorities. Because usually internal issues are attributed to the 
president, although his prerogatives are reduced, we considered the tabloids’ 
tendency to ascribe them to Băsescu as natural. Furthermore, this might also be 
the result of his previous campaigning actions, which have conveyed the idea of 
the omnipotent president.
 
 For the time being, it is difficult to say whether these tabloids might have 
coagulated in an alternative public sphere. An investigation of the mainstream 
„quality” press would be needed in this regard and so would a further exploring 
into the language and style of the tabloids.
 
 The similarities observed between Romania and Bulgaria in what concerns the 
approach of political issues in tabloids raise a number of questions: Are there 
other common patterns in the East European mediated public spheres? Or is there 
an Eastern European public sphere? If so, what are issues it is confronted with?
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   NOTE 
 1  
	 Beneficiary of the „Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable 
	 Society” project, co-financed by the European Union through the European 
	 Social Fund, Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources and 
	 Development, 2007-2013.  
  2  Jürgen Habermas, The structural 
	 transformation of the public sphere. An inquiry into a Category of 
	 Bourgeois Society  , translated by Thomas Burger in collaboration with 
	 Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1962/ 1989), 27.
  
  3  A specific line of theorization in the 
	 established literature has analyzed how the initial Habermasian definition 
	 can generate new paradigms of the public sphere. We consider the following 
	 works as being illustrative for this type of theoretical research: Patrick 
	 Eisenlohr, „Religious Media, Devotional Islam, and the Morality of Ethnic 
	 Pluralism in Mauritius“, World Development  39/2 (2010); Jim 
	 McGuigan, „The Cultural Public Sphere”, European Journal of Cultural 
	 Studies 8/4 (2005); Allan McKee, The Public Sphere: An 
	 Introduction  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); John 
	 Michael Roberts, „Introducing Competence and the Public Sphere”, in The 
	 Competent Public Sphere  (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
  
  4  For instance the stand promoted by: 
	 Roderick P. Hart, Seducing America: How Television Charms the Modern 
	 Voter  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Kathleen Hall 
	 Jamieson, David S. Birdsell, Presidential debates. The challenge of 
	 creating an informed electorate  (New York: Oxford University Press, 
	 1988).
  
  5  Ralph Negrine, Stylianos 
	 Papathanassopoulos, „The «Americanization» of Political Communication: A 
	 Critique”, The International Journal of Press/Politics , 1/2 
	 (1996); Margaret Scammel, „The wisdom of the war room: US campaigning and 
	 Americanization”, Media, Culture and Society , 20 (1998).
  
  6  Jos De Beus, „Audience Democracy: An 
	 Emerging Pattern in Postmodern Political Communication”, in  Kees Brants, 
	 Katrin Voltmer (editors) Political Communication in Postmodern 
	 Democracy. Challenging the Primacy of Politics  (New York: Palgrave 
	 Macmillan, 2011).
  
  7  The alleged tabloidization of 
	 political communication has been both postulated and explored in studies 
	 such as: S. Elizabeth Bird, „News We Can Use : An Audience Perspective On 
	 The Tabloidisation of News in the United States”, The Public  5/3 
	 (1998); Frank Esser, „Tabloidization’ of News : A Comparative Analysis of 
	 Anglo-American and German Press Journalism”, European Journal of 
	 Communication  14/ 3 (1999); Bob Franklin, Newszak and Newsmedia . 
	 (London: Arnold, 1997); Bob Franklin, „Newszak: entertainment versus news 
	 and information”, in Anita Biressi & Heather Nunn (editors) The Tabloid 
	 Culture Reader  (New York: McGraw Hill Open University Press, 2008); 
	 Ulrike Klein, „Tablodised political coverage in Bild-Zeitung”, The 
	 Public  5/3 (1998); Dick Rooney, „Dynamics of the British tabloid 
	 press”, The Public  5/3 (1998); Raymond Williams, Communications (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1962).
  
  8  Franklin, Newszak, 1997; 
	 Joseph N.Cappella, Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Spiral of Cynicism: The 
	 Press and the Public Good  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
  
  9  Franklin, Newszak, 1997; Paul 
	 Manning, News and News Sources: A Critical Introduction  (London: 
	 Sage, 2001); Brian McNair, Journalism and Democracy: An Evaluation of 
	 the Political Public Sphere  (London: Routledge, 2003); Mick Temple, 
	 „Dumbing Down is Good for You”. British Politics  1(2006)
  
  10  In this regard Rooney, „Dynamics”, 
	 1998 represents an illustrative example of such a positioning.
  
  11  Bird, „News”, 1998.; Pierre 
	 Bourdieu, On television , translated by Priscilla Parkhurst 
	 Ferguson (New York:  The New Press, 1996); Franklin, Newszak, 
	 1997; John Langer, Tabloid television: popular journalism and the 
	 ‘other news’  (London & New York: Routledge, 1998); Rooney, „Dynamics”, 
	 1998.
  
  12  Habermas, „Structural”, 1962/ 1989.
  
  13  Habermas, „Structural”, 1962/ 1989.
  
  14  Jay G. Blumler, Dennis Kavanaugh, 
	 „The Third Age of Political Communication: Influences and Features”, 
	 PoliticalCommunication  16 (1999); Jesper Strömbäck, „Four Phases 
	 of Mediatization: An Analysis of the Mediatization of Politics”, International Journal of Press/Politics  13/3 (2008); Judith Stamper, 
	 Kees Brants, „A Changing Culture of Political Television Journalism”, in 
	 Kees Brants, Katrin  Voltmer (editors) Political Communication in 
	 Postmodern Democracy. Challenging the Primacy of Politics (New York: 
	 Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
  
  15  Gianpietro Mazzoleni, Winfried 
	 Schulz, „«Mediatization» of Politics: A Challenge for Democracy”? Political Communication  16/ 3 (1999).
  
  16  Peter Dahlgren, Television and 
	 the Public Sphere. Citizenship, Democracy and the Media  (London: Sage 
	 Publications, 1995).
  
  17  Theodor Adorno, Max  Horkheimer, 
	 „The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception”, in Simon During 
	 (editor), The Cultural Studies Reader (London: Routledge, 1993); 
	 Jay Blumler, Michael Gurevitch, The Crisis of Public Communication  
	 (London: Routledge, 1995); Todd Gitlin, „Bites and blips : chunk news , 
	 savvy talk and the bifurcation of American politics”, in Peter Dahlgren, 
	 Collin Sparks (editors), Communication and Citizenship: Journalism and 
	 the Public Sphere in the New Media Age  (London: Routledge, 1991); 
	 Hart, Seducing , 1994; Jamieson, Birdsell, Presidential 
	 debates,  1988; Dominique Mehl, „The television of intimacy. Meeting a 
	 social need”, Réseaux. The French journal of communication 4/ 
	 1(1996); Neil Postman, Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in 
	 the Age of Showbusiness  (New York: Penguin, 1986).
  
  18  Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: 
	 The Collapse and Revival of American Community  (New York: Simon & 
	 Schuster, 1995).
  
  19  Bourdieu, On television,  
	 1996 ; Capella, Jamieson, Spiral,  1997.
  
  20  Franklin, Newszak, 1997; 
	 Franklin , „Newszak”, 2008.
  
  21  Adorno, Horkheimer, „The Culture”, 
	 1993.
  
  22  Mehl, „The television”, 1996.
  
  23  Michael X. Delli Carpini, Bruce 
	 A.Williams, „Let us infotain you: Politics in the new media environment”, 
	 in W. Lance Bennett, Robert M. Entman (editors),Mediated Politics. 
	 Communication in the future of democracy  (New York:  Cambridge 
	 University Press, 2001). 
  
  24  Rosa Van Santen, Popularization 
	 & Personalization. A Historical and Cultural Analysis of 50 Years of Dutch 
	 Political Television Journalism  (Amsterdam, the Netherlands: 
	 Almanakker, Oosterhout, 2012).
  
  25  Kees Brants, „Who’s Afraid of 
	 Infotainment?” European Journal of Communication  13/ 3(1998); John 
	 Street, „«Prime time politics»: Popular culture and politicians in the UK”, The Public  7/2 (2000).
  
  26  Camelia Beciu, Comunicare şi 
	 discurs mediatic. O lectură sociologică  (Communication and media 
	 discourse. A sociological reading ) (Bucharest: Comunicare.ro, 2009); 
	 Camelia Beciu, Sociologia comunicării şi a spaţiului public  (The 
	 sociology of communication and of the public space ) (Iaşi: Polirom, 
	 2011); Blumler, Kavanaugh, „The Third”, 1999.; Ulf Himmelstrand, „A 
	 Theoretical and Empirical Approach to Depoliticization and Political 
	 Involvement”, Acta Sociologica. Approaches to the Study of Political 
	 Participation , 6(1962); Christina Holtz-Bacha, „Professionalization of 
	 Political Communication”, Journal of Political Marketing  1/4 
	 (2002); David L. Swanson, Paolo Mancini (editors) Politics, Media, and 
	 Modern Democracy. An International Study of Innovations in Electoral 
	 Campaigning and Their Consequences  (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 
	 1996).
  
  27  McNair, Journalism ,2000; 
	 Postman, Amusing , 1986; Temple, „Dumbing”, 2006.
  
  28  Gitlin, „Bites”, 1991; Daniel C. 
	 Hallin, „Sound bite news: Television coverage of elections, 1968–1988”,  Journal of Communication,  42/ 2 (1992); Hart, Seducing, 1994; 
	 Michael J. Robinson, „Public affairs television and the growth of political 
	 malaise: The case of «The selling of the pentagon»”, The American 
	 Political Science Review , 70/2 (1976).
  
  29  Gitlin, „Bites”, 1991.
  
  30  Blumler & Kavanaugh, 1999; 
	 Himmelstrand, „A Theoretical,” 1962; Holtz-Bacha, „Professionalization”, 
	 2002; Swanson, Mancini, Politics,  1996; Van Santen, Popularization,  2012.
  
  31  Beciu, Comunicare,  2009; 
	 Beciu, Sociologia,  2011; Blumler, Kavanaugh, „The Third”, 1999; 
	 Holtz-Bacha, „Professionalization”, 2002; Swanson, Mancini,Politics,  
	 1996.
  
  32  De Beus, „Audience” : 19.
  
  33  Capella, Jamieson, Spiral,  
	 1997.
  
  35  Brants, „Who’s Afraid”, 1998; 
	 Dahlgren, Television ,1995; Jeffrey P. Jones, Entertaining 
	 politics: new political television and popular culture  (Maryland: 
	 Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005).
  
  36  Brants, „Who’s Afraid”, 1998.
  
  36  e.g. Dan Caspi, „American-Style 
	 Electioneering in Israel: Americanization versus Modernization”, in David 
	 L. Swanson, Paolo Mancini (editors) Politics, Media, and Modern 
	 Democracy. An International Study of Innovations in Electoral Campaigning 
	 and Their Consequences  (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1996); Kent 
	 Asp, Peter Esaiasson, „The Modernization of Swedish Campaigns: 
	 Individualization, Professionalization, and Medialization”, in David L. 
	 Swanson, Paolo Mancini (editors)Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy. 
	 An International Study of Innovations in Electoral Campaigning and Their 
	 Consequences  (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1996).
  
  37  Delli Carpini,Williams, „Let us 
	 infotain”, 2001; Jones,Entertaining , 2005; Sonia Livingstone, 
	 Peter Lunt, Talk on television. Audience Participation and Public 
	 Debate  (New York: Routledge, 1994/2001); McNair, Journalism ,2003; 
	 Street, „«Prime time politics»”, 2000; John Street, „The Transformation of 
	 Political Modernity?”, in Barrie Axford, Richard Huggins (editors) New 
	 Media and Politics  (London: Sage Publications, 2001); Temple, 
	 „Dumbing”, 2006; Liesbet Van Zoonen, Stephen Coleman, Anke Kuik, „The 
	 Elephant Trap: Politicians Performing in Television Comedy”, in  Kees 
	 Brants, Katrin Voltmer (editors) Political Communication in Postmodern 
	 Democracy. Challenging the Primacy of Politics  (New York: Palgrave 
	 Macmillan, 2011).
  
  38  Matthew A. Baum, „Sex, lies, and 
	 war: How soft news brings foreign policy to the inattentive public”,  American Political Science Review , 96/ 1(2002); Van Zoonen, Coleman, 
	 Kuik, „The Elephant”, 2011; Temple, „Dumbing”, 2006. 
  
  39  Carme Ferré-Pavia, Catalina 
	 Gayà-Morlà, „Infotainment and citizens ’ political perception : Who’ s 
	 afraid of  «Polònia»”? Catalan Journal of Communication & Cultural 
	 Studies , 3/1(2011).
  
  40  Jones,Entertaining , 2005; 
	 Livingstone, Lunt, Talk, 1994/2001.
  
  41  John Street, Sanna Inthorn, Martin 
	 Scott, „Playing at Politics? Popular Culture as Political Engagement”,  Parliamentary Affairs  65(2012); Liesbet Van Zoonen, Entertaining 
	 the citizen: When politics and popular culture converge  (Oxford, UK: 
	 Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).
  
  42  Ferré-Pavia, Gayà-Morlà, 
	 „Infotainment”, 2011.
  
  43  Peter Lunt, Mervi Pantti, „Popular 
	 Culture and the Public Sphere: Currents of Feeling and Social Control in 
	 Talk Shows and Reality TV”, in Richard Butsch (editor) Media and Public 
	 Spheres  (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); David Nolan, 
	 „Tabloidisation Revisited” (1998), 
	 http://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=427191853059782;res=IELHSS 
	 1998, retrieved 03.08. 2012.
  
  44  John Fiske, Television Culture  
	 (London and New York: Routledge,1987).
  
  45  John Hartley, Joshua Green, „The 
	 public sphere on the beach”, European Journal of Cultural Studies  
	 9/3 (2006); McKee, The Public Sphere , 2005.
  
  46  McGuigan, „The Cultural”, 2005, 
	 435.
  
  47  Van Zoonen, Coleman, Kuik, „The 
	 Elephant”, 2011.
  
  48  Collin Sparks, „Popular Journalism: 
	 Theories and Practice”, in Peter Dahlgren, Collin Sparks (editors) Journalism and Popular Culture  (London: Sage, 1992).
  
  49  Blumler, Kavanaugh, „The Third”, 
	 1999; Gitlin, „Bites”, 1991; Henrik örnebring, Anna Maria Jönsson, „Tabloid 
	 Journalism and the Public Sphere: a historical perspective on tabloid 
	 journalism”, Journalism Studies  5/3 (2004).
  
  50  Susan Burnes, „Metaphors in press 
	 reports of elections: Obama walked on water, but Musharraf was beaten by a 
	 knockout” , Journal of Pragmatics  43/8 (2011); Werner Holly, 
	 „Tabloidisation of political communication in the public sphere”, in Ruth 
	 Wodak,Veronika Koller, (editors) Handbook of Communication in the 
	 Public Sphere  (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2008). 
  
  51  Van Santen, Popularization,  
	 2012.
  
  52  Burnes, „Metaphors”, 2011; 
	 Franklin, Newszak, 1997; Franklin , „Newszak”, 2008; Lian Zhu, 
	 „Tabloidisation with Chinese characertistics: a case study of Depth 105”, Critical Arts  25/1 (2011).
  
  53  Steven Barnett, „Dumbing Down or 
	 Reaching Out : Is it Tabloidisation wot done it ?”, The Political 
	 Quarterly  69(1998); Bird, „News”, 1998; Blumler, Kavanaugh, „The 
	 Third”, 1999; Connell, 1998; Franklin, Newszak, 1997; Franklin , 
	 „Newszak”, 2008; Collin Sparks, John Tulloch, Tabloid tales: Global 
	 debates over media standards  ( Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 
	 2000).
  
  54  Blumler, Kavanaugh, „The Third”, 
	 1999;  Bird, „News”, 1998; Sparks, „Popular Journalism”, 1992; Van Santen, Popularization,  2012.
  
  55  Blumler, Kavanaugh, „The Third”, 
	 1999; Franklin, Newszak, 1997; Franklin , „Newszak”, 2008; Van 
	 Santen, Popularization,  2012.
  
  56  Barnett, „Dumbing Down”, 1998; 
	 Bird, „News”, 1998; Franklin, Newszak, 1997; Franklin, „Newszak”, 
	 2008. 
  
  57  John Fiske, „Popularity and the 
	 Politics of Information”, in Peter Dahlgren, Collin Sparks (editors) Journalism and Popular Culture  (Newbury Park: Sage, 1992); Kevin 
	 Glynn, „Tabloid Television’s Transgressive Aesthetic: A Current Affair and 
	 the «Shows that Taste Forgot»”, Wide Angle  12/2 (1990); Sofia 
	 Johansson, „«They Just Make Sense»: Tabloid Newspapers as an Alternative 
	 Public Sphere”, in Richard Butsch, (editor) Media and Public Spheres  
	 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Örnebring, Jönsson, „Tabloid 
	 Journalism”, 2004.
  
  58  McGuigan, „The Cultural”, 2005: 
	 429.
  
  59  Fiske, „Popularity” 1992.
  
  60  John Tomlinson, „And Besides, the 
	 Wench is Dead: Media Scandals and the Globalisation of Communication”, in 
	 James Lull, Stephen Hinerman (editors) Media Scandals: Morality and 
	 Desire in the Popular Culture Marketplace  (London: Polity Press, 
	 1997), 77.
  
  61  Bird, „News”, 1998; Franklin, Newszak, 1997; Franklin , „Newszak”, 2008.
  
  62  Esser, „Tabloidization”, 1999.
  
  63  Bird, „News”, 1998; Esser, 
	 „Tabloidization”, 1999.
  
  64  Klein, „Tablodised”, 1998; Rooney, 
	 „Dynamics”, 1998; Ridrigo Uribe, Barrie Gunter, ”Research Note: The 
	 Tabloidization of British Tabloids”, European Journal of Communication  
	 19/ 3 (2004).
  
  65  Chin-Chuan Lee, Chinese 
	 Media,Global Contexts  (London: Routledge, 2003); Zhu, 
	 „Tabloidisation”, 1992.
  
  66  Frederick Schiff, „The Dominant 
	 Ideology and Brazilian Tabloids: News Content in Class-Targeted 
	 Newspapers”, Sociological Perspectives  39/1 (1996).
  
  67  for instance Cristian Aszalos, Crampoanele României şchioape. Tabloidizarea presei sportive româneşt i 
	 (The crampons of limping Romania. The tabloidization of the Romanian 
	 sport press ) (Cluj-Napuca: Eikon, 2011);  
     Karol Jakubowicz, „Television and Elections in Post-1989 Poland: How 
	 Powerful Is the Medium?”, in David L. Swanson, Paolo Mancini (editors) Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy. An International Study of 
	 Innovations in Electoral Campaigning and Their Consequences  (Westport, 
	 Connecticut: Praeger, 1996);  
     Michał Głowacki, Bogusława Dobek-Ostrowska, Comparing Media Systems in 
	 Central Europe ( Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
	 Wrocławskiego , 2008).
  
  68  Van Santen, Popularization,  
	 2012.
  
  69  Esser, „Tabloidization”, 1999; 
	 Graeme Turner, „Tabloidization, journalism and the possibility of 
	 critique”, International Journal of Cultural Studies , 2/1 (1999); 
	 Brian Winston, „Towards Tabloidization ? Glasgow revisited , 1975-2001”, Journalism Studies , 3/1(2002).
  
  70  Klein, „Tablodised”, 1998; 
	 Örnebring, Jönsson, „Tabloid Journalism”, 2004; Uribe, Gunter, „Research 
	 Note”, 2004.
  
  72  Van Santen, Popularization,  
	 2012.
  
  74  Aszalos, Crampoanele , 
	 2011.
  
  75  Bird, „News”, 1998; Franklin, Newszak, 1997; Franklin , „Newszak”, 2008.
  
  78  Bird, „News”, 1998; Franklin, Newszak, 1997; Franklin , „Newszak”, 2008.
  
  79  Bird, „News”, 1998; Blumler, 
	 Kavanaugh, „The Third”, 1999; Franklin, Newszak, 1997. Franklin , 
	 „Newszak”, 2008; Sparks, „Popular Journalism”, 1992; Van Santen, Popularization,  2012.
  
  80  Bird, „News”, 1998; Franklin, Newszak, 1997; Franklin, „Newszak”, 2008.
  
  85  Fiske, Television, 1987.
    
						FLORINA CREŢU – PhD candidate, 
						National School of Political and Administrative Science. 
 
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