Reforme instituționale

The Institutionalisation of the Romanian Party System
 

CLARA VOLINTIRU
[London School of Economics and Political Science]

Abstract:
This paper explores the level of institutionalisation achieved by the Romanian political system since transitioning to democracy. Following through the key components of an institutionalised party system, the inquiry looks at the stability of interparty competition in Romania and the depth of its parties’ roots in society. These components are measured through such indicators as electoral volatility or the cohesiveness of the ideological preferences. Their levels suggest that the Romanian party system isn’t fully instituionalised, with fluctuating volatility and a rather incohesive ideological positioning of both voters and parties. This paper argues that in response to the double challenge of poor institutionalisation of the political parties and the party system as a whole, informal remedies, such as patronage of public jobs, or proprietary use of state resources, become highly attractive solutions for electoral success.

Keywords: party system institutionalisation; electoral volatility; clientelism; Romania

Institutionalisation can be defined as ‘the process by which a practice or organization becomes well established and well known’, and consequently people can ‘develop expectations, orientations, and behavior based on the premise that this practice or organization will prevail in the foreseeable future’¹. At the foundation of this paper lays the assessment of the restrictions and opportunities the newly established political parties were facing at the time of regime change. The Romanian political system, as in the case of other new democracies, was faced with the significant challenge of fast-tracked institutionalization or consolidation². The existent literature highlights 4 key components of an institutionalised party system: stable interparty competition, stable attachments between voters and parties, legitimacy and solidity of the political parties³. Neither was thoroughly fulfilled at the time of the first democratic elections in this country. Consequently, political parties were faced with a vastly different situation than in a matured democratic setting.

The institutionalisation of the party system is reliant on the institutionalisation of the political parties that compose it. Reversely, one or more political parties may be well institutionalised without the consolidation of the party system as a whole. The legitimacy and solidity of a party may be considered endogenous to the party itself, as being dictated by the circumstances of its genesis and it’s survival strategy. But, the elements of interparty competition and the depth of social roots refer to an indissoluble connection between the parts (i.e. political parties) and the whole (i.e. political system). This paper explores the institutionalization of the Romanian party system, by looking at such traits as electoral volatility, or the depth of party roots. Finally, the informal remedies are considered, such as the proprietary use of state resources to compensate for the organisational deficiencies of a political party.  

Party system development

In the eve of the postcommunist period, Romanian parties had no clear ideological identification, not enough human resources – in terms of party membership and logistical organisation, and as a consequence, they didn’t have a significant material support either. In terms of each political party’s level of institutionalization, it is highly important that it develops an organizational structure – ‘an independent structure as opposed to a personalist vehicle’. In contradiction, all current political parties remain vastly reliant on their leader’s persona, signaling a persistent challenge in their institutionalisation process. In addition to this, the electorate itself was recovering from decades of electoral apathy, with previously non-existent pluralism, and only façade participation to elections whose winners were known beforehand. Therefore, in brief, the political parties, as well as the party system as a whole, weren’t institutionalised.

Electoral volatility
Studies on the issue of party system institutionalisation consider two dimensions: the stability of interparty competition and the depth of party roots in society⁵. The first dimension of the stability of interparty competition is reflected in the level of electoral volatility, thus accounting for the stability in the electorate’s preferences, as well as the consistency of the political offer – which and how many political parties compose the party system in a country.

The challenges of the transition period are reflected in the highest levels of electoral volatility Romania recorded for the 1992 elections⁶. Some of the existent measurements of this indicator, based on the Pedersen Index⁶, show that subsequent elections have seen a substantial improvement in terms of the stability of voting preferences, with only the 2004 elections seeing a slight surge in the overall trend⁷. The initial levels of volatility, some of the highest in Central and Eastern Europe, left the Romanian party system with the mark of ‘extreme volatility’, in the first decade after the fall of communism, having a mean electoral volatility as high as 53⁸.

The stability of interparty competition is influenced by a multitude of factors, ranging from the level of economic development, to the effective number of parliamentary parties. Still, the definitive impact each of these variables has on the electoral choices is a matter of controversy and continuous enquiry. It appears that the form of the electoral system has the most clear-cut influence on interparty competition – the mixed electoral system being associated with much higher levels of volatility⁹. Another element affecting electoral preferences is the frequency of party switching – candidates shifting from one party to another to further their political ambitions (i.e. win elections, receive political appointments). Romania has seen a periodical surge in party shifting, mostly associated with coming elections – local or national, or the recent governmental turnover. Helier and Mershon point out how party switching is mostly due to personal ambitions, and is ‘especially likely under conditions of heightened uncertainty’¹⁰. Furthermore, such actions not only create inconsistency in the political offer, contributing to the levels of electoral volatility, but they also erode citizens’ confidence in political parties¹¹.

Ideological incohesiveness

Gherghina and Jiglau consider that Romania has reached a certain level of electoral continuity and stability in recent years, but the ‘electoral support of each family is too fluid and makes it impossible to claim that the ideological families have strong roots in the society’¹². For a better conceptualization, we should look at two different axes of political incohesiveness. The first is that between the political parties – the political offer, and the ideological and programmatic positions they adopt. The second is that between the electorate – the political demand, and the ideological and programmatic preferences they hold.

Considering the 1st axis of political incohesiveness (political parties – ideological/programmatic position), we can find evidence of incohesiveness in the actions of the Romanian political parties. Downs considers that the last legislative election, in 2008, ʻwas further evidence of a Romanian party system that is failing to produce alternatives with clear ideological distinctions’¹³. If such avowed adversaries as the PD-L and PSD could agree to share power, opportunism and self interest were seemingly trumping fidelity to enduring policy positions and campaign promisesʼ. Not only, have PD-L (the liberal democrats) and PSD (the social democrats) been ʻavowed adversariesʼ, but they are ideologically antagonist, as PSD scores 3.6 points on the left-right scale of ideological positioning (with 1=left, and 10=right), and PD-L scores 6.5 on the same scale¹⁴. On the following elections – the presidential race in November 2009, as well as the local elections of 2012, the alliance between the same leftist PSD, and the rightist PNL (the national liberals), whose score is by 0.2 points greater than that of PD-L on the left-right scale, constructed an even larger ideological stretch. Still, this isn’t sufficient evidence of ideological inconstancy, as large coalitions may also be formed for the sake of better governance, and stability. But, when an in-depth analysis is conducted of the parties’ platforms and political manifestos, we can clearly see their programmatic convergence, as most of the 2008/2009 electoral promises are similar for all parties¹⁵.

For the second axis of political incohesiveness (electorate – ideological/ programmatic preferences), we find rather conflicting evidence. On one hand, we witness a rate of 57, 2% of the Romanian population which claims that their electoral choice is based on the programs which the candidates are promoting (BCS 2009). This would not only lead us to believe that clientelistic practices are only affecting the choices of a minority of the population, which would mean that electoral outcomes aren’t changed significantly by it, but also, that the Romanian electorate has a strong ideological positioning. This finding is reflected to a certain extent by the fact that 52% of the Romanian electorate has an ideological preference, but the balance is precarious as up to 41% of the electorate can’t /won’t position themselves ideologically, and 5% vote contrary to their ideological beliefs¹⁶. Comsa also observes how the abstract ideological choice of the voters is reflected in their political choices, but when it comes to specific programs, voters’ preferences are surprisingly homogenous, disregarding the diverging abstract ideological preferences¹⁷. 

Along this latter axis, apart from ideological inconstancy, or indifference, we also find evidence of low levels of interest in politics and activism. The World Values Survey (WVS) from 2005 shows that 68.1 % of the Romanian electorate isn’t interested in politics, and over 60 % would never, under any circumstance sign a petition, join a boycott, or attend lawful/peaceful demonstration. These data show that the Romanian electorate is detached from the political process, and little hope is pinned on the outcomes generated by it. Still, my research on the presidential elections from 2009 seems to suggest, the Romanian electorate is highly interested in the confrontation between the candidates, and high interest is generated by the electoral campaigns themselves. Thus, while the political system itself doesn’t appeal too much to the average voter, the persona of the candidate is of great interest, and fuels extensive public debates, which would suggest that there is a highly personalistic attachment in the process of casting votes. This type of low interest in the political system, coupled with a high attractive power of the candidates’ charisma is also a prolific setting for clientelism.

Informal remedies

Patronage proved itself a potent solution for a party’s organizational deficiencies (i.e. shallow party roots), as Blondel observes ‘personal ties form the basis of political parties’ institutionalisation’¹⁸. The existent literature on clientelism has highlighted the tendency of patronage networks to use public offices as a political resource in consolidating their organization. Lyrintzis evocatively defined this form of clientelistic interaction based on public offices as ‘bureaucratic clientelism’ in his study on post-junta Greece¹⁹. The politicisation of civil servants, especially in the new democracies of Europe is a phenomenon that is often hinted at, but far too seldom properly investigated. A good example of an in-depth study on the politicisation of senior civil servants was recently conducted in Hungary²⁰ reaching the expected conclusion that personnel networks within the state apparatus are highly reliant on political support. Consequently, we can safely infer that this reliance on political support will generally lead to political bias in public decision-making, thus reinforcing the clientelistic pyramid of the patron party.

In Romania, the exploitation of public offices for political purposes starts with a loose legislative framework. The law no. 188/1999 with its subsequent amendments and alterations constitute the legal basis of the civil servant’s statute. Unfortunately, there is persistent disagreement between political parties on the actual implementation and methodology. Thus, the appointments to public office remain a vast resource for rewarding loyal clients of political parties. As such, with each change of government we see the replacement of many people in different public offices. Still, different legal constrains exist, such as appointments by open competition, which would apparently safeguard against excessive politicisation. Unfortunately, as Ionita et al observe a ‘way recently identified to shortcut legislation is seen in the proliferation of short-term contract appointments in senior government positions (directors of ministries, heads of agencies, prefects), as such contracts do not require open competition to fill in the office’²¹.

Another often used method of circumventing the legal constrains to discretionary replacements, one which is both costly and counterproductive for the proper functioning of the state apparatus, is supplementing the positions or the institutions. Thus, we can see in Table 1 how the total number of public sector employees has evolved since 2000 to present. The peak of the size of the public sector seems to have been reached in 2009, with 234,100 persons. Since then, a strongly publicized campaign to reduce the size and costs of the public sector has been apparently undertaken, which would suggest a diminishing clientelistic reliance on this public resource. But, as Stan and Zaharia signal ‘while civil servants had to shoulder deep cuts, Government’s unwillingness to cut hundreds of unneeded public administration posts fuelled public dissatisfaction’²².

Another troubling phenomenon that is happening is that while the figures show a decrease in the total number of public offices, many public institutions have been dissolved and others have been founded to serve the same purposes. This institutional rearrangement permits a new full staffing process that does not stand out in terms of increasing the size of the state apparatus. Certain senior management replacement in public institutions are taken at any cost to the state budget, as disgruntled civil servants who have been unlawfully replaced, usually win their case in courts. This leads to paradoxical situations where the same office is occupied by several persons at the same time. Other situations include substantial compensations being paid for the graciousness of leaving certain positions available to the party clientele, as in the case of Proprietatea Fund, when former manager received almost half a million euros when leaving the office before term.

The politicisation of public offices is the key to extensive distortions a clientelistic system is able to exert on public functions. By placing trusted people in key positions of the state apparatus, a political organisation is able to control the other two categories of public resources: assets and funds. These practices did not escape the general public’s perception, as the Eurobarometer shows: 60% of Romanians tend not to trust regional or local public authorities. Additionally, Romanians consistently perceived wastefulness of government spending and favouritism in decisions of government officials to be very high over the past years (see Annex 1). Finally, the diversion of public funds and/or goods is mentioned in the DGA’s Report (2010) to be the most pervasive form of corruption affecting Romania (see also Annex 1).

Tble 1. Evolution of the Number of Public Sector Employees

Source: INSS

State capture represents the process by which political parties, once in power, take control of the public resources in such a manner as to further their own political purposes. This is a potent survival strategy for political parties whose electoral prospects are uncertain. The channelling of public funds to government’s own constituencies, or the politicisation of the state apparatus are just some of the approaches of parties attempting state capture.

In Romania, the use of the discretionary governmental funds, such as the Reserve Fund has become a classic example of the proprietary use of public resources to further political agendas. These funds have been designed to cover „urgent or unexpected events” (Law No. 500/2002) such as natural calamities. In practice, they have been increasingly used to supplement the budget of electoral strongholds. An audit report of the Romanian Court of Accounts (2009) has signalled the frequent use of the vague justification ‘financing material and capital expenses’ used for the allocation of these funds, as well as the overall lack of transparency and accountability with regard to the management of these funds. According to an assessment of the Institute for Public Policies (IPP), between 2008 and 2011, only 10% of these funds were actually used for urgent or unexpected situation, the vast majority being used for current expenses.

The prefferential distribution of funds is striking when compiling the list of allocations made through the Government Decision (H.G.) 255/2012, with the political affiliation of each beneficiary local administration’s mayor or county council president. These are in proportion of 95.15% granted to mayors or county council presidents affiliated to the ruling coalition, comprising PD-L, UDMR, UNPR and the parliamentary group representing ethnic minorities (see Table 2). The politicisation of public funds in this case is obvious, as the top beneficiary, the Dâmboviţa County Council – a PD-L stronghold, receives 10 mil. lei (2.28 mil. €²³) – more than all the opposition’s local administrations, which received in total only 8 mil. lei.

Table 2. Political Distribution Reserve Fund 2012 (allocations of over 1,000,000 lei)

Source: compiled by the author based on official data from the Government Decision (H.G.) 255/2012, the Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP), Centralizator Rezultate Finale Alegeri Locale 2008

It is a sensitive matter to attempt to disentangle the degree to which patronage networks, and clientelistic linkage mechanisms played a role in the formation and evolution of political parties in a new democracy. In the case of Romania, this challenge is even greater as no similar study exists on this case study. By showing how old patronage networks where preserved within the new party system of this post-communist country, and how clientelistic practices played a role in certain parties’ entrenchment in power, we can further our understanding of what accounts for the similarities between the electoral practices of different new European democracies. There are enough case studies, or comparative assessments on clientelism to understand that this is no longer an isolated phenomenon, embedded in archaic societies, but rather an interest driven political strategy²⁴. By showing how clientelistic practices played a role in certain parties’ entrenchment to power in Romania, we can further our understanding of what accounts for the similarities between the organisational and electoral practices of different new European democracies

The issue of how clientelism affects the democractic system is usually marginalised on the basis of its limited impact in a properly regulated system with robust political competition. Both of these suppositions are problematic in the case of new democracies. In the first instance, in what concerns the regulatory system, the problem is that it was often specifically designed to circumvent many of the clientelistic networks and the flows of goods and services they are based on. A good example would be the political nominations to public offices, as opposed to nominations based on the civil service regulations. Some countries of this group, such as Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, or the Czech Republic have remedied this aspect, to a certain extent, with reforms aiming to create a professional civil service²⁵. But when such practices become endemic, the legislative limitations may come as too little, too late. In the case of Romania, the evidence suggests that while the legislative framework has been revisited and reformed, the old practices persist disregarding. 

In the second instance, in what concerns the political competition, there is also evidence to suggest that this doesn’t diminish the extent of clientelistic interests in our case study. In the initial phase, political patronage was indeed extended on the basis of affiliation (membership, contributor, supporter etc.) to a certain political party, usually the ruling party. The theory on the effects of political competition, as it was put forward by Grzymala-Busse, asserts that opposition parties that constitute a plausible governing alternative would be able to constrain the spread of the state exploitation tendencies of the ruling parties²⁶. But, with the noticeable exception of electoral periods, the political opposition in Romania didn’t sanction with consistency and perseverance the informal exchanges of favours and services of the ruling party.

A simple explanation for this is the spread of the interest networks across the ruling-opposition divide. Many of the clientelistic networks formed, and consolidated in the context of the free market, span across different political parties. In an attempt to ‘diversify their portofolio’ economic elites started to back different political actors, according to their circumstantial needs. This tendency made the political competition a separate issue from the task of preserving certain economic interests. Consequently, it gradually led to a significant overlap between the political and the economic areas – ‘the parties do not act on an ideological basis. What they have in common is their affinity for making business’²⁷. This tendency is also suggested by the constant increase in the number of business managers on parties lists – ‘in exchange for providing parties with the resources needed to effectively compete in political arena, businesses also want to put their representatives on party lists and send them to such key decision-making bodies as the national parliament’²⁸.

Concluding remarks

According to the 2011-2012 Global Competitiveness report by World Economic Forum, EU democracies, such as Italy, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania (see Annex 1) score well bellow the world average in their public trust in politicians. While most of the EU is currently swept by a powerful wave of political distrust, these South East European examples have in common very high perceptions of corruption, wasteful allocation and diversion of public resources, and favoritism in government decisions. As opposed to other member states, for these political systems, it was a long process of disenchantment with their administrative system, which predated this prolonged economic crisis.

Fueled by a considerable decrease in general welfare, political disillusion plagues most of Europe, allowing peripheral or upstart parties, offering unrealistic or impractical alternatives, to show surprising performances in recent elections. As damaging as this electoral volatility may be for the stability and cohesiveness of party systems across Europe, it is where informal linkages start to expand that the damage is most severe. The institutional distrust has electoral consequences, as in some cases, voter-party relationships tend to be mediated by corruption, and a parallel electoral system develops, firmly rooted in clientelistic linkages and preferential resources distribution, rather than programmatic platforms. This ideologically detached political setting provides fertile ground for governing parties to expand even further their mechanisms of proprietary use of state resources.

Thus, in this general crisis of confidence, and looking at Romania’s recent efforts as a case study, an important question emerges: how to tackle the sources of institutional distrust – corruption, wastefulness and political discredit, without further reinforcing institutional distrust?In the absence of a simple answer, caution has to be exerted, striving for the public’s perception of legitimacy and propriety of all governing actions. Questionable actions and political inconsistency leave a high motivation for enforcing a clientelistic system, adding a dimension of uncertainty that further deepens the population’s distrust vis-à-vis its representatives and public institutions.

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Annex 1

Annex 2

Table 1. Institutional Corruption in Romania
How corrupt are the following institutions? (1 not at all corrupt-5 extremely corrupt)

Source: compiled by the author based on the Global Corruption Barometer (2004-2010), www.transparency.org

CLARA VOLINTIRU – Doctorand, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).

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