20 de ani de la căderea comunismului

The Romanian Civil War:
A Theoretical Discussion On The Proximate Causes of Violence¹

ALEXANDER GHALEB
[National Defense University, USA]

Romania has just lived a trauma, the communist totalitarianism, and this is a chance for historians to assume a role of cultural therapy, teaching people to come to terms with the past.²
Adrian Cioflanca

Abstract:
The paper is a theoretical account of the Romanian Revolution viewed from the eyes of an American international security strategist who recounts his childhood in Romania. The author believes that the unresolved nature of the violence during the revolution discouraged many historians and political scientists from applying genuine theoretical foundations to the study of a sustained conflict that resulted in 1,104 official deaths and 3,352 wounded. Ultimately, the author suggests, the proximate causes of the violence in 1989 provide sufficient evidence to define the revolution as a coup related civil war. The fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only against the families of the victims of the conflict, but also against the study of contemporary history itself.

Keywords: Romanian Revolution; Cold War; Political Violence

I. Introduction

I was only seven years old when the Berlin Wall collapsed, on November 9, 1989. That same day, my grandfather, a retired Colonel in a special counterintelligence unit, and one of the many former national security advisers to Nicolae Ceausescu, was asked to report to the Department of Defense for an emergency top-level meeting.³ Having spent the following weekend with my grandparents in Bucharest, I remember my grandfather whispering to my grandmother: „There’s going to be a revolution.”

The „Romanian Revolution” of December 1989 is „the most dramatic and important event in recent Romanian history.”⁴ Yet, almost a quarter of a century later, it remains also „the greatest enigma of Romanian history.”⁵ Unfortunately, the „unresolved nature”⁶ of the Romanian 1989 conflict discouraged many historians and political scientists from applying genuine theoretical foundations⁷ to the study of a sustained conflict that resulted in 1,104 official deaths and 3,352 wounded.⁸ The fact that a conflict that meets the casualty element of the civil war definition does not attract the attention of the academia is an injustice not only against the families of the victims of the conflict, but also against the study of contemporary history itself. Without a clear and accurate interpretation of the events that unfolded in Romania in December 1989, it is impossible to fully understand the complexity of the events that led to the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, and to the end of the Cold War.

Romania was the only Eastern-bloc country where the transition from communism to democracy was preceded by the use of force. To this day, I still dream about staying motionless next to my grandparents in front of a firing squad of so called revolutionaries; listening to my grandmother plead in Russian for our life. Perhaps, the Moldavian (Russian) officer felt pity for us when he called off his men, or perhaps, it was all just a bad dream.⁹ At last, I heard my grandfather shout: „Ionut, get in the car!” Not a word was spoken until we reached our destination. There, my grandfather turned around and said: „Not a word to your father about this! Or you will never see me again!”

I must admit, however, that knowing the truth about the Revolution is not only important to me as an orphan, but also to me as an international security strategist. By analyzing the origins of the Romanian Revolution apart from the other 1989 Revolutions of Eastern Europe (particularly, those of the Soviet satellite states: Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia), we may gain insight into the parameters that made the difference between a peaceful and a violent revolution. In order to make this distinction, the following questions must be answered: Why did Ceausescu think that his political survival was worth shedding blood for, while other Eastern and Central European communist leaders like Jaruzelski, Grósz, Krenz, Zhivkov, and Husák peacefully resigned their positions? What was the „strategic dilemma”¹⁰ that led to violence in Romania? Was the use of violence the result of information failures? Finally, did Ceausescu believe that preemptive force was necessary; and if he did, who or what was Ceausescu afraid of?

Scandalously, most of the interpretative Romanian and French literature on the Romanian Revolution¹¹ leaves all these questions of extreme importance unanswered. In an attempt to address the „many doubts”¹² regarding the exact nature of the events that unfolded in Romania in December 1989, this paper will focus only on identifying the proximate causes (that enabled the outbreak of violence)¹³ as opposed to focusing on the underlying causes of the conflict (which are necessary conditions, but not sufficient to explain the outbreak of violence).¹⁴ The distinction between proximate and underlying causes is required to determine why, despite similar social, political, economic and structural conditions throughout Eastern and Central Europe, only in Romania grievances led to a violent civil war.

II. The Stages of the Romanian Revolution

The Romanian Revolution started in Timisoara on December 15, 1989.¹⁵ Academic papers, however, rarely focus on this initial phase of the revolution. Siani-Davies writes only one sentence on this phase: „It started as a small-scale protest against a clumsy attempt by the authorities to evict a dissident priest, Laszlo Tokes, from his residence.”¹⁶ Revolutionary Silviu Brucan (a veteran Stalinist)¹⁷ also dedicates this phase only one sentence: „news of the bloody repression in Timisoara on the night of 16 December spread all over Romania and abroad.”¹⁸

Between December 16 and December 22 „the revolution was spreading like a brush fire across towns and cities across the Banat and Transylvania,”¹⁹ with armed confrontations against the communist regime in major cities like Cluj-Napoca, Arad, Sibiu, and Brasov. While these clashes are mentioned in academic literature, scholars almost never focus on these events when they analyze the revolution. No scholar bothered to answer why 118 were people²⁰ were killed in Timisoara alone. Instead, scholars like Siani-Davies insisted that the capital should be regarded as „the main set of the disturbances.”²¹

The „documented” revolution starts on December 22, when Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu fled Bucharest with a military helicopter (as demonstrations erupted in Bucharest).²² An hourly account of the events in this phase is made available in much of the academic literature. The Army takes the side of the people, and chooses the political entrepreneur (and former head of the Romanian Young Communist League),²³ Ion Iliescu – and his National Salvation Front – to officially represent the revolutionaries. Near midnight, 22 December, Ion Iliescu appears on television for the first time to declare the National Salvation Front as the spearhead of the Revolution.²⁴ Urban guerrilla warfare²⁵ is now waged in all major cities until 25 December, when Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu are sentenced to death following a mock trial organized by a military tribunal. The couple is executed that same day, and video of the execution is shown repeatedly on TV.

Christmas has never been the same for me since that day. I remember watching the execution on TV from my grandparents’ vacation house outside of Bucharest. My grandmother ordered me to get out of the room as the execution aired, but my grandfather insisted that it is important for me to stay and watch. After the killing, my grandfather faced my grandmother and said: „It’s over; the traitors won. God help us all!” My grandparents never disposed of their Communist ID cards; hoping that one day Communism will return to Romania. They always proclaimed Ceausescu’s innocence. A decade after the revolution I remember my grandmother say „Ceausescu would have never ordered the death of the people, unless he was misguided in doing so.”

III. Redefining the Romanian Revolution as a Civil War

War kills people, destroys resources, retards economic development, ruins environments, spreads disease, expands governments, militarizes societies, reshapes cultures, disrupts families, and traumatizes people.²⁶
Jack Levy and William Thompson

To understand the motivations behind Ceausescu’s decision to engage in violence rather than resign to domestic pressures, or seek mutual settlement (like other communist leaders in Eastern Europe have done), it is necessary to first look at the nature of the violence during the revolution. The goal here is to determine whether „the most violent of the events that transformed Eastern Europe in 1989”²⁷ can be categorized as part of a civil war.

This categorization is important, because most scholars do not recognize the Romanian Revolution as a civil war; making this conflict an irrelevant subject in the study of warfare outside of Romania. For example, Harbom and Wallensteen²⁸ wrongfully classify the Romanian Revolution as a minor armed conflict (citing between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths for the duration of the conflict). While scholars like Harbom and Wallensteen are right to classify the Romanian Revolution as an armed conflict (defined as „a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths”),²⁹ they are wrong when they classify the conflict as minor.

A closer look at Harbom and Wallensteen’s dataset indicates that the start date used (the date of the first battle-related death in the conflict) was December 22, 1989, which represents the onset of violence in Bucharest. The problem with this date is that the 978 revolutionaries arrested in Timisoara alone before demonstrations erupted in Bucharest (as reported by the Military Court of Timisoara),³⁰ and the 162 deaths and 1,101 wounded in Banat and Transylvania between December 16 and December 22³¹ cannot be overlooked in the study of the revolution. Harbom and Wallensteen’s conclusion is thus flawed because the data they used was inconsistent with the facts of the revolution; a situation that, I hope, will be rectified in the future.

Given the changing nature of warfare in the contemporary security environment, I use Levy and Thompson to define war as „sustained, coordinated violence between two political organizations.”³² In order for the Romanian Revolution to be categorized as a civil war, two questions must be answered: first, whether the violence was coordinated and sustained; and second, whether it was between two political organizations.

An armed conflict between two political organizations: One of the difficulties in defining the Romanian Revolution as a civil war lays in the failure to identify the two political organizations involved in the onslaught. This is perhaps due to the failure of the National Salvation Front to take responsibility as the leader of the revolutionaries in the early stages of the revolution. The other side is clearly identified as the ruthless Securitate (the state’s secret police dubbed as ‘the terrorists’).³³ However, if the statements of General Militaru are true, and the National Salvation Front began its existence six months prior to the revolution,³⁴ then, unquestionably, the Romanian Revolution was a conflict between two political organizations.

The coordinated and sustained violence argument: If we use the „Correlates of War Project” criterion of 1000 battle deaths do determine the „sustained” element of the definition of war;³⁵ then the Romanian Revolution fits this criterion. With 1,104 official deaths in just 10 days,³⁶ the Romanian Revolution crosses the threshold of violence required to be a civil war (by 104 deaths). One must recognize, however, that it is very unusual for a civil was to be fought in only 10 days. Recent studies show, however, that „civil wars arising out of coup attempts and popular revolutions are usually quite brief.”³⁷ The challenge here will be to define the Romanian conflict as a coup-related civil war or a popular revolution (classifications that cannot be made without clear knowledge of the proximate causes).

It is, however, a fact that between December 16 and December 25, both sides employed a regular and coordinated use of force of significant magnitude. To start with, Ceausescu ordered the Army to suppress the protests in Timisoara. In response, the National Salvation Front stormed the National Television Building, and began coordinating the revolution live, on TV.

IV. A Levels of Analysis Approach to the Romanian Civil War

Theory A: A Third Level Argument.
Romania as the Center Stage of the Soviet’s Demise
And the Soviet Dniester Plot to Assassinate Ceausescu

We have to work in complete unity and with determination against all of those who are trying to weaken the strength and unity of our nation and who are in the service of various espionage services and imperialist circles to divide Romania again and to subjugate our people.³⁸
Nicolae Ceausescu’s Last Speech

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the „Romanian Revolution” is the single most important event in Eastern Europe that hinted to the inability of the Soviet Union to control its Satellite States. A non-Communist government had already been elected in Poland in September 1989; and on December 10, President Gustáv Husák of Czechoslovakia resigned, after he appointed a non-Communist government to run his country. However, despite the events in Poland and Czechoslovakia, it was still uncertain whether the USSR would allow its satellites to ally themselves with the West.

For half of the 20th century, the Cold War „shaped both international and domestic politics and cultures.”³⁹ During this time, the Warsaw Pact coerced the Soviet Satellites to remain unswerving supporters of the Kremlin; fact proven by USSR’s repression of the Prague Spring, followed by the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The fact that the Soviet Union did not intervene militarily to suppress the Revolution in Romania clearly indicated to the West the demise of the Warsaw Pact, and that the Cold War was over. Shortly after the Romanian Revolution, Brezezinski wrote that „we no longer can dismiss the possibility that a Romanian-type situation might arise from some major economic crisis or some major incident or some major collision.”⁴⁰ In other words, it was just a matter of time until the Soviet Union was going to collapse (either peacefully, or by force).

There are many Romanian and French scholars today, however, who insist that the USSR did in fact intervene in Romania, and that the Romanian Revolution was in reality a Russian-planned „coup d’état.”⁴¹ Classified as „conspiracy theorists,” authors like the former General Ion-Mihai Pacepa, and to a certain extent even Siani-Davies, focus on the fact that „the events of December 1989 cannot be divorced from the other Eastern European revolutions of that year and the breakup of the Soviet bloc.”^42>  General Pacepa, takes this theory a step further, and believes that the systemic level did not only provide „the permissive international context required”⁴³ for the success of the revolution; but also played an active role in both the planning and execution of the revolution – a claim that I have found is neither entirely true; nor entirely false.

After my personal interaction with General Pacepa in the fall of 2010 – when I was deeply humbled by his willingness to assist me in better understanding the events and processes that made the revolution possible – it became very hard for me to completely dismiss many of his theories, despite the fact that I generally disagree with the sequence of events that he has previously written about.⁴⁴  While I have found incongruous Pacepa’s views that the revolution was a Russian plot to remove Ceausescu from power, his theory finds a lot of support in Bachman’s account that Ceausescu’s Stalinist philosophy „conflicted with Gorbachev’s program of Glasnost (openness) and Perestroika (restructuring).”⁴⁵ It is indeed true that Ceausescu was an open detractor of Gorbachev’s foreign policy, and was actively and openly striving to build alliances with other communist countries that opposed both Soviet openness and restructuring plans.⁴⁶ I further understand where Pacepa is coming from: as early as 1988, Michael Ledeen – who has been a great inspiration to me throughout my time as a former military intelligence officer – and General Pacepa predicted that the Kremlin would replace Ceausescu with its own puppet (also citing Ceausescu’s opposition to Glasnost and Perestroika as the main reason).⁴⁷ Despite this, there is no evidence to suggest that the Soviets were responsible for the planning and execution of the revolution. This being said, it is clear, however, that Ceausescu – just like Pacepa – believed that Soviet spies played a major role in inciting violence during the first days of the revolution. They very well might have.

Ceausescu himself stated that the revolution was the product of „various espionage services.”⁴⁸ Conspiracy theorists point out that he feared a Russian invasion more than he feared NATO. One scholar wrote that, for Ceausescu, „the clearest threat was a Soviet or Warsaw Pact intervention in Romania similar to what occurred in Czechoslovakia in 1968.”⁴⁹ General Pacepa, the highest-ranking intelligence officer that ever defected from a communist country, also acknowledged these fears. Pacepa describes most of the revolutionaries, to include Iliescu, not as „political entrepreneurs,”⁵⁰ but as KGB spies; the National Salvation Front becoming the instrument used by the Soviet Union to wage war against Ceausescu.

While the evidence for this claim is circumstantial (and could be categorized as an attempt to discredit and delegitimize Ion Iliescu and his National Salvation Front), the argument is also not without logic. The strongest argument that conspiracy theorists bring, however, is the fact that General Nicolae Militaru was previously forced into retirement for being a KGB agent.⁵¹ While this may be true, I am skeptical to believe these accusations; because my grandmother was also forced into retirement for the same reason (although there were no grounds to the charges, other than that my grandmother spoke fluent Russian, and that her name came up as the Kremlin’s favorites for a ministerial position in Romania – an opportunity that she previously turned down when offered to her).

However, while I side with Siani-Davies, who insists „the importance of such conspiracy prior to the overthrow of communism should not be over exacerbated [or overstated],”⁵² it is also clear that the Romanian Revolution can be categorized as a coup-related civil war (even though it may not have been specifically a Soviet planned coup). By definition, a coup-related civil war is „a civil war between groups that aim to take control of a state, and that are led by individuals who were recently members of the state’s central government, including the armed forces.”⁵³ It is a fact that all the key leaders of the National Salvation Front were former communist members of the state’s central government (specifically in the cases of Iliescu and Brucan), including the armed forces (in the case of General Militaru).

Theory B: A Second Level Argument.
Romania at the Border of Western and Orthodox Christianity:
How Ceausescu was Led to Believe that Preemptive Force was Necessary to Avoid Secession of Banat and Transylvania from Romania

For better or worse, phrases such ‘the Cold War’ and ‘the clash of civilizations’ matter. In a similar way, so do maps. The right map can stimulate foresight by providing a spatial view of critical trends in world politics.⁵⁴
Robert D. Kaplan

A second theory of the Romanian Revolution takes into account Samuel Huntington’s „Boundary of Western Civilization.”⁵⁵ Huntington’s great historical line (initially drawn by William Wallace)⁵⁶ that separates Western Christianity from Orthodox Christianity splits Transylvania and Banat with their Uniate, Catholic and Reformist (Calvinist) populations apart from the rest of the Orthodox Romania.⁵⁷ This theory emphasizes that the Romanian Civil War started because Ceausescu mistook the disturbances in Timisoara as part of a bigger plot meant to separate Banat and Transylvania from Romania.

At the end of his last speech as President, Ceausescu repeatedly talked about a plot to break up the Romanian territory. Not surprisingly, protests in Timisoara broke out when the authorities attempted to evict a dissident Hungarian Reformist (Calvinist) priest, Laszlo Tokes, from his residence.⁵⁸ Church members (ethnic Hungarians) decided to stand outside of the house and protect their priest from the Romanian authorities. Romanians started to join the crowd, which soon became belligerent against the regime. Ceausescu, believing this is a Hungarian provocation against the state, sent the Army and the Securitate to suppress the protests. When these forces began firing at protesters,⁵⁹ the entire city joined the demonstrations.

To support this theory, it is important to note that Ceausescu was actively involved in a process of „forced assimilation of minorities”⁶⁰ in Romania. In 1988, 8,000 villages were officially scheduled to be destroyed;⁶¹ most of which were inhabited by minorities. In 1987, 40,000 ethnic Hungarians who fled Romania in terror gathered in front of the Romanian Embassy in Budapest to protest „the planned demolition of Transylvanian villages” which was regarded as an attempt to dissolve the ethnic Hungarian population.⁶² That same year, when Gorbachev visited Romania, Ceausescu was warned that the mistreatment of the Hungarian minority, demonstrates lack of „tact” and „consideration.”⁶³ Ceausescu ignored the counsel, and in 1989 many churches and villages were destroyed in an attempt by authorities to „severe cultural and historic links to the past.”⁶⁴ By this time, Hungary already recalled its Ambassador, and filed a complaint against Romania with the UN Human Rights Commission.⁶⁵ In March 1989, the United States openly criticized Ceausescu’s policies, and France also recalled its Ambassador.⁶⁶  Finally, in April 1989, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl called Ceausescu’s treatment of ethnic minorities as „intolerable.”⁶⁷

Ceausescu had good reasons to be worried about an ethno-religious upraising in Banat and Transylvania. The latter two were returned from Austria-Hungary to Romania only recently, in 1920, by the Treaty of Trianon,⁶⁸ and – as Samuel Huntington accurately identified – the two regions have a distinct historical and cultural development. Even ethnically, in 1989, 25% of the population in Banat was German and Hungarian.⁶⁹ The very issue of loss of identity is of extreme importance in analyzing the conflict. This is because the symbolic, non-political, indivisible issue of religion seems to also be at play in Transylvania. Geetrz wrote that „a threat to a religious belief system will provoke a reaction from those who depend on it for their understanding of reality.”⁷⁰ The minorities that Ceausescu perceived were waging the revolution in Transylvania were not only ethnic minorities; they were ethno-religious minorities. The ethno-religious aspect of the conflict is noteworthy because it fits a model that has no exceptions since the end of the Cold War: that „ethno-religious minorities do not engage in rebellion unless they also make demands for some form of self determination.”⁷¹ The loss of the autonomy that ethnic minorities enjoyed before Ceausescu came to power was a topic that gravely affected not only the Romania-Hungary diplomatic relations, but the future of peaceful relations between the Romanian authorities and the ethno-religious minorities in Transylvania and Banat.

Furthermore, Hanlon’s 6th Proposition states: „if an ethnic group is excluded or is threatened with exclusion from the polity, then the ethnic group will be more likely to adopt violent means.”⁷² The ethnic Hungarians were clearly excluded from any position of power within the State.⁷³ The underlying cultural and perpetual factors⁷⁴ in Transylvania were the systemic destruction of the multi-ethnic identity; which occurred through the destruction of villages and churches and the cultural discrimination against Banat and Transylvania’s ethnic minorities. The path from ethnic discrimination to violence is clearly delineated in the writings of Jonathan Fox: „discrimination against an ethnic minority causes that minority to cause grievances over this discrimination; these grievances cause an ethnic group to mobilize; finally, mobilized ethnic groups are more likely to take part in ethnic conflict in the form of protest and rebellion.”⁷⁵ This basic model (developed originally by Ted Gurr) is also used by the Minorities at Risk project; and is also relevant in justifying Ceausescu’s perception of the violence in Banat and Transylvania.

To make matters worse for Ceausescu, ethnic groups in Romania also enjoyed a great deal of international support; where most of the international community, to include the United States and even the Soviet Union, acknowledged and openly accused the Romanian government of repressing its minorities. Because of this, the Securitate was prepared to suppress any public disturbance in Banat and Transylvania. Clearly, we know today that Ceausescu’s perception of the violence in Banat and Transylvania was misguided – of the 162 deaths and 1,101 wounded in Banat and Transylvania, most of them were Romanian Orthodox. This, however, does not disprove the fact that the proximate causes of the revolution were ethno-religious – in fact, Ceausescu’s misguided perception that ethnic minorities were responsible for the revolution to spread „like a brush fire”⁷⁶ across Banat and Transylvania between December 15 and December 22 is of extreme importance in understanding the proximate causes of the violence.⁷⁷

While there are few empirical studies available that address the ethno-religious aspect of the Romanian Revolution, they are very illuminating; and may help us understand why Ceausescu believed he was acting preventively in response to the perceived mobilization of ethnic minorities in Banat and Transylvania. Despite the fact that religion and ethnicity were not among the primary reasons the National Salvation Front joined the revolution, the ethno-religious proximate causes must be recognized in order to fully understand the multifaceted, complex influences that made the difference between a peaceful and a violent transition from communism to democracy in Romania.

Theory C: A First Level Theory.
Was the Romanian Revolution a Spontaneous Popular Uprising?

I once again reaffirm the truth that the Romanian revolution was the result of the will and political action of all social categories and not at all the result of a coup d’état or a plot, as some political circles and groups say, with a certain interest in mind.⁷⁸
Ion Iliescu

In the fall of 2003, President Iliescu stated to a group of Romanian scholars from the George Washington University (see picture right) that the Romanian Revolution was a carefully planned action by the National Salvation Front. Iliescu genuinely believed that the 1989 Revolution can only be understood at the first level of analysis. Waltz’s first level of analysis focuses on the human nature, and presumes that the individual in power „has an important causal impact” on the onset of violence.⁷⁹ Scholars like George Galloway and Bob Wylie agreed with Iliescu, and blamed the Ceausescus for the onset of violence; for them, Ceausescu simply committed the atrocities in Timisoara and Bucharest because „they were bad people.”⁸⁰ This view also seems to be shared by most Romanian revolutionary scholars (who refuse to admit that there is any rational, strategic thinking in Ceausescu’s decision to use force).

These scholars view the causes of the revolution as identified at the Ceausescus’ trial. For them, the proximate cause is the ‘genocide’ committed in Timisoara and Bucharest against the Romanian people, while the underlying causes are depicted by alluding to the tyranny of the 25 years under Ceausescu (in which time Ceausescu’s greed deprived the Romanian people of food, electricity, and heating). Ceausescu and Iliescu are viewed here as the two major political figures in the conflict; as representatives of the Securitate and the National Salvation Front. On December 21, 1989, political analysts still believed that Nicolae Ceausescu will be the victor of the conflict.⁸¹ At this time, the names of the leaders of the revolution were still unknown to the public. And yet, four days later, Ion Iliescu personally authorized, in writing, the execution of the Romanian dictator. To date, Ion Iliescu insists that „no political group or force has the right to consider itself the exclusive author of the Romanian revolution, which was and will remain the revolution of the entire Romanian people.”⁸² And yet, during the revolution, beginning with 22 December, he took control of all government institutions with the exception of the oppressive Securitate. The National Salvation Front acted as the opposing political organization necessary in redefining the conflict as a popular revolution.

There are multiple issues with this theory. From the start, genocide cannot be identified as the proximate cause of the Revolution because, first, history shows that genocide was not actually committed, and second, violence by and in itself does not answer the question of why violent means were employed. On the other hand, the underlying causes presented do hold some weight. The accusations listed in Ceausescu’s trial succinctly address the social, economic, political, and even the structural factors required to classify them as underlying causes.⁸³ Of these underlying causes, the social and economic factors were the most apparent: Siani-Davies wrote that „the most visible aspect of Romania’s plight to the outside visitor in the late 1980s was a struggle to find food. […] By the time of the revolution, the official monthly ration for many Romanians had been reduced to a kilo of flour, sugar, and meat, half a kilo of margarine, and five eggs.”⁸⁴ I also remember the cold winters and the lack of hot water during my late childhood; as well as learning how to read and write under candlelight while growing up in Bucharest.

However, the sense of grievance (brought upon by economic, political, structural, and social factors), which „fueled popular mobilization”⁸⁵ in Romania, was also present in other East European countries; but did not result in violence. The problem with Iliescu’s theory is that Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia also had very similar bad leaders, and they did not order their Armies to suppress the people. The „bad people” scenario does not explain why the Ceausescus chose „war over peace, confrontation over accommodation.”⁸⁶ As the head of state, Ceausescu had many experienced political advisers, and access to a well established intelligence apparatus; which he used often (my grandfather being part of it until 1987). Ceausescu believed he was God (the Genius of the Carpathians); but he was not a fatalist. But if Ceausescu viewed the events in Timisoara as a second level ethno-religious conflict ready to erupt (as explained in the previous section), did he also fear a coordinated effort by the NSF?

The answer is simple: NO! As a practitioner in the art of warfare, I disagree with the definition of the Romanian conflict as a popular revolution. Iliescu’s interpretation of the revolution (as a „spontaneous rebellion” caused by people unhappy with the totalitarian regime)⁸⁷ is both inaccurate and incomplete because a popular revolution is defined as „a civil war that, at its outset, involved mass demonstrations in the capital city in favor of deposing the regime in power.”⁸⁸ But the Romanian Revolution did not start in the capital; it started at the periphery – which is never the case with popular revolutions (as argued also by James Fearon, professor in the School of Humanities and Sciences at Stanford University).⁸⁹ This is not the case, however, with a coup-related civil war (as discussed in Theory A).

Finally, Iliescu’s account fails to explain what started the conflict that led to the fall of „the most repressive state in Eastern Europe.”⁹⁰ He focuses on the „urban guerrilla warfare”⁹¹ after 22 December, and fails to explain why Ceausescu decided to use violent means to suppress demonstrations in Banat and Transylvania between December 16 and December 22 (a question answered in the analysis of Theory B). The popular revolution theory simply fails to provide an answer as to why 118 people⁹² were killed in Timisoara during that time.

V. Conclusion

Changing the name of a government does not transform the mentality of a people. To overthrow the institutions of a people is not to re-shape its soul. The true revolutions, those which transform the destinies of the peoples, are most frequently accomplished so slowly that the historians can hardly point to their beginnings.
Gustave Le Bon

Concerning the proximate causes of the Romanian Revolution, it can be clearly stated that Ceausescu perceived the onset of violence in Timisoara as more about culture and religion than about freedom and democracy (due to Ceausescu’s mistaken belief that an attempt for the secession of Banat and Transylvania from Romania was underway – as presented by Theory B). This theory explains why Ceausescu believed that his political survival was worth shedding blood for, while other Eastern and Central European communist leaders like Jaruzelski, Grósz, Krenz, Zhivkov, and Husák peacefully resigned their positions. Furthermore, refutation of Theory A – which proclaims that Romania was the center stage of a Soviet plot to assassinate Ceausescu – ascertains that the Romanian Revolution meets the criteria to be classified more as a „coup-related civil war” – not to be confused with a Soviet planned coup – rather than a „popular revolution” – as demonstrated in the repudiation of Iliescu’s accounts.

The most surprising element of the revolution remains, however, the ethnic one. On the one side, most Romanian security analysts assume today that the 1989 Revolution erased the memory of the forced assimilation of the national minorities by the Romanian authorities. This explains why, to this day, Romanian authorities refuse to acknowledge the ethnic facets of the Romanian Revolution – which are essential in understanding Ceausescu’s assessment of the situation during the initial stages of the revolution, and thus the proximate causes of the violence that ensued. On the other side, the current leaders of the Hungarian minorities use Wolff’s argument that „the root causes of ethnic conflict cannot simply be wished away overnight.”⁹³ They insist that almost a quarter of a century after the revolution, the ethnic identity issue continues to dominate the Romanian political agenda; and ethnic minorities continue to be forcibly assimilated, and discriminated against – despite un-proportional positive representation of minorities in the Romanian government. This explains why, when he talks about the revolution, Laszlo Tokes (the Calvinist priest that was at the heart of the events in Timisoara) refers to it as the „stolen”⁹⁴ revolution;⁹⁵ and why the Banat-born German Nobel Prize-winning novelist, Herta Müller believes that „the whole country is afflicted by collective amnesia.”⁹⁶

Almost a quarter of a century after the coup-related civil war, this essay shows that the real revolution in Romania has not yet started.⁹⁷ The social revolution will not begin until the entire „truth” about the events of 1989 is revealed to the Romanian people. Perhaps many Romanian security analysts will disagree with my conclusion that the „distortion of social memory”⁹⁸ is the result of the post-communist oblivion – even concealed guilt – about the tragedy of minorities during Ceausescu’s regime. But admitting this fact is paramount in order to begin the process of true national healing. Reconciliation cannot be without acknowledgement of guilt – as painful, or unpleasant that may be for the Romanian authorities.

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ALEXANDER GHALEB – International security strategist and doctoral student at the Central European University. He is also a military officer serving in the United States Army, and holds a Masters of Arts in Strategic Security Studies from the National Defense University.

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