Identitate naţională

End of Westphalia:
The Implications of the UN Resolution 1973 (2011) for the State-Territorial Sovereignty of Romania¹

 

ALEXANDER GHALEB
[National Defense University, Strategic Security Studies, USA]

Abstract:
This paper underscored that NATO’s interventions in Kosovo, and more importantly in Libya, are events just as significant in the study of international relations as is the Peace of Westphalia. The author believes that the two conflicts have triggered the emergence of a new international societal framework that will significantly transform our perceptions of social order, legitimacy, authority, territory, control over borders, sovereignty, and autonomy in favor of exclusivist identities, and at the detriment of the state. Ultimately, the author suggests, this will limit the ability of the Romanian state to respond to future ethnic unrest within its own borders.

Keywords: Exclusivist Identities, Kosovo, Libya, Romania, State Sovereignty, Westphalian Order

We struck regime forces approaching Benghazi to save that city and the people within it. We hit Qaddafi’s troops in neighboring Ajdabiya, allowing the opposition to drive them out. We hit Qaddafi’s air defenses, which paved the way for a no-fly zone. We targeted tanks and military assets that had been choking off towns and cities, and we cut off much of their source of supply.
Barack Obama, President of the United States²

1. Introduction

Sasson Sofer from Hebrew Univer­sity’s Department of International Rela­tions – currently a visiting fellow at the Watson Institute for International Stu­dies – recently wrote that „very few events are considered to be a historical turning point. The Peace of Westphalia evidently is such a case.”³ But while in the traditional security environment the Peace of Westphalia shaped our perceptions of sovereignty, particularly in regards to the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force, this paper advances the theory that in the contemporary security environment⁴ the UN Resolution 1973 (2011) – which authorized NATO to take all necessary measures to protect the people of Benghazi – is equally significant because it provides a legal precedent, and more importantly, a powerful incentive for groups belonging to exclusivist identities to advance their fight for self determination through violent means.⁵ This erosion of state sovereignty in the contemporary security environment is already a major topic of discussion among many scholars of international relations and strategic security studies because it will challenge the very tenets of the organization of modern society. In order to determine the implications of this fundamental structural shift in our understanding of state-territorial sovereignty for the Romanian society itself, it is important to expand first on the origins of this sovereignty – the Peace of Westphalia – and then on the challenges that it faces today, primarily through the passing of the UN Resolution 1973 (2011) – where violence by exclusivist identities was considered more legitimate than the state violence meant to suppress them. Finally, an intimate snapshot of the inter-ethnic discourse in Romania reveals that this shift away from the Westphalian state system could have grave implications for other members of the European Union, forcing national authorities to revise their stance on autonomy, or prepare for future unrest.

2. The Peace of Westphalia and State Sovereignty in the Traditional Security Environment

Westphalia laid down the basic tenets of sovereignty –
the principle of territorial integrity and of non-interference
in the affairs of national states. These are principles that
have proven invaluable through the years in the prevention
of armed conflict between states.⁶
James Byron Bissett⁷

On October 24, 1648, the treaties of Osnabrück and Münster ended the Thirty Years War, and brought into being the Peace of Westphalia; a historical demarcation which many academics consider one of the most significant events of the past millennia.⁸ Resulting from intense diplomatic efforts – involving sixteen European states and almost half of the Imperial States – the peace negotiations redefined the architectural principles of the modern structure of governance, and gave rise to what we know today as the „Westphalian” state system.⁹ Following the terrors of many religious wars that characterized Europe for nearly a century, and that „profoundly changed political and social structures, and perhaps even collective mentalities”,¹⁰ the Peace of Westphalia emphasized a shift from a religious to a secular world, providing a point of origin for the advancement of raison d’état – the rationalization of overriding state power.

While the origins of this overarching framework has been a matter of debate among many historians and political science theorists, the Peace of Westphalia remains today „the most important demarcation to influence international relations theory”,¹¹ and is credited with the creation of the territorial state¹² as a geographically-bound political unit. Its impact is also considered to be immeasurable in identifying the very „principles and purposes of the state system;”¹³ since the Westphalian order thoroughly conditioned the traditional Western perceptions of social order, legitimacy, authority, territory, control over borders, sovereignty, and autonomy.¹⁴

James Caporaso – professor of the Department of Political Science at the University of Washington – emphasized that the Westphalian order ultimately has to do with interactions between various authority structures where the state represents the highest level of authority in the anarchic international system. This sovereign authority incorporates the exclusive right of states to decide on matters within their own borders; and their prerogative to prevent outside authority structures from meddling into their internal affairs (or domestic politics):

The basic idea is one of a system of territorially organized states operating in an anarchic environment. These states are constitutionally independent (sovereign) and have exclusive authority to rule within their own borders. They relate to the population within their borders as citizens (Staatsangehoerige, those belonging to the state) and to other states as legal equals.¹⁵

But while most of Europe embraced the Westphalian system relatively early in modern history, states did not achieve a monopoly on the use of force until late nineteenth century;¹⁶ and the international community did not fully recognize the sovereignty of the state until after the Second World War, following the disintegration of the British and French colonial empires.¹⁷ Indeed, it took the Westphalian order over three hundred years to come into existence, and be fully recognized by the international system. Yet, despite this fact, the Peace of Westphalia remains a legitimate landmark in history, and will continue to be „a critical stage in the gradual, though by no means uniform development which began before 1648, and continued beyond it;”¹⁸ reaching its zenith with the Helsinki Accords of 1975, where sections III and IV – titled „Inviolability of Frontiers”, and „Territorial Integrity of States” – guaranteed the 35 signatory states a non-aggression promise from the more powerful participants.¹⁹

3. The Erosion of State Sovereignty in the Contemporary Security Environment: from NATO’s War over Kosovo to NATO’s War over Benghazi

While sovereign Governments have the primary responsibility
to protect their own citizens from such catastrophes, when they are unable or unwilling to do so, that responsibility should be taken up by the wider international community.
Gareth Evans²⁰

While in the traditional security environment the Westphalian system classified the state as the most important unit of analysis within the field of strategic security studies, the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force has been challenged in the contemporary security environment, placing in doubt the very future of „territorially based sovereignty – that is to say, the future of the modern state.”²¹ To support this claim, Mary Kaldor – Director of the Centre for the Study of Global Governance at the London School of Economics – emphasized that the very autonomy of the state is eroded both from below – by identity politics, „to mean movements which mobilize around ethnic, racial, or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power”²² – and from above – „by the trans-nationalization of the military forces.”²³

It could be thus argued that Kenneth Waltz’s second levels of analysis, the state level – which emphasizes the supremacy of the Westphalian state in the anarchic international system – is slowly supplanted by Waltz’s first and third levels of analysis, the individual and systemic levels.²⁴ This change in how we understand international relations is relevant to remark, because it underlines a shift in authority from states to ethnic groups – bound by national, linguistic, religious or tribal identity – with the now formal consent of supranational organizations. While the right of self-determination is not a new concept in international law – being explicitly highlighted even in the first article of the 1945 United Nations Charter²⁵ – it wasn’t until recently that violence by exclusivist identities were considered more legitimate than the state violence meant to suppress them. Whether we consider the ethnic conflict in Kosovo, or the tribal conflict in Libya, the underlying message is clear: first, the state no longer retains a monopoly on the legitimate use of force; and second, the international community began to shift away from the Westphalian state system. Because of this, NATO’s interventions in Kosovo, and more importantly in Libya, are events just as significant in the study of international relations as is the Peace of Westphalia.

Only one decade after the end of NATO’s war over Kosovo, it is already widely accepted by the international relations academia that the Kosovo conflict challenged our traditional knowledge of state „sovereignty and territorial integrity.”²⁶ Furthermore, NATO’s intervention on humanitarian grounds „has shaken the global framework of international peace and security that has governed the relationship among sovereign states since the founding of the United Nations”,²⁷ and has questioned the very nature of the Westphalian state system – which holds that the protection of the people is primarily a responsibility of the state – by suggesting that states can forfeit their sovereignty if they fail to protect their citizens, or if they resort to violent means to suppress them. This has two serious implications: first, the international intervention on humanitarian grounds means that the geographically-bound borders are no longer inviolable,²⁸ and second, the restriction to use violence against one’s people places self-determination of people „above the territorial integrity of states, and could become legal practice”²⁹ for exclusive identities striving for autonomy, or even independence.

But while the Westphalian order has been frequently violated throughout the ages, nothing compares with the UN Resolution 1973 (2011) which authorized „Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, […] to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi.”³⁰ This resolution is particularly significant because in the Kosovo case, NATO acted without explicit authorization from the UN Security Council – thus without international consensus – whereas in Libya, the UN Resolution 1973 was adopted by a vote of 10 in favor to none against, with 5 abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India, Russian Federation).

Ultimately, we are witnessing the emergence of new international norms officially dictating that the state no longer holds a monopoly of legitimate organized violence. In his speech to his nation, President Obama argued that „Qaddafi had lost the confidence of his people and the legitimacy to lead.”³¹ Furthermore, in their speeches prior to the vote on UN Resolution 1973, the representatives of the United Kingdom, Lebanon, and Colombia took the floor and openly stated that „Libyan authorities had lost all their legitimacy.”³² Finally, and perhaps more importantly, several national governments, such as those of France, Italy, and Qatar, have already formally recognized the Libyan rebels – the Transitional National Council – as the ”legitimate representative”³³ of the Libyan people. This should undoubtedly raise many concerns to European countries like Greece, Spain, Bulgaria, and Romania,³⁴ who continue to struggle with ethnic groups searching for ways to obtain more autonomy from the state.

4. Implications for the State-Territorial Sovereignty of Romania

Transylvania looks a lot like a micro-region of the same size as Kosovo. Kosovo had gained its independence, so why can the Székely Land not obtain its autonomy? We must take it to the street, if necessary; if it is needed, then the Székely Land needs a Catalan type of instrument.³⁵
László Tőkés

Romania is a sovereign state that is worth paying particular attention to: it has an active ethnic Hungarian minority – composed largely of people who perceive themselves as „second class”³⁶ – that struggles to gain more autonomy from the state. Ethnic Hungarians, the largest minority group in Romania, represent about seven percent of the Romanian population – approximately 1.6 million. Many of them live in Transylvania, particularly in a region known as Székely Land, where over three quarters of the population is ethnic Hungarian. Since the fall of Communism in Romania, this ethnic group „has been the target of attacks by nationalist politicians”,³⁷ and as a result, calls for cultural, economic, and even territorial autonomy became a common occurrence in Székely Land. This heated debate between sovereignty and the people’s right of self determination also gave birth to extremes on both sides: on one side, right-wing Romanian groups use the ethnic Hungarians as a convenient scapegoat for poor local economic performance and other regional and national problems; while on the other side, some extremist elements of the ethnic Hungarians only ask for autonomy in the hope of an eventual secession and unification with Hungary.³⁸

The 2011 country forecast by the Political Risk Services agrees that „the heightened risk of domestic ethnic clashes”³⁹ is still very much a possibility in Romania. To discount these risks, the Romanian authorities emphasize on the tenets of the Westphalian order, and on the inviolability of state sovereignty. But instead of calming the waters, these approaches have made things worse. For Example, after Viktor Orbán – the current Prime Minister of Hungary – stated in Székely Land in 2008, that „autonomy means a thicker slice of bread, higher wages, and more jobs as well as self-respect and a successful community in the Carpathian Basin”,⁴⁰ one year later, in a meeting with his Hungarian counterpart, the Romanian President Traian Basescu emphasized that the Székely Land will never achieve autonomy in Romania. He added that „Romania is defined as a national sovereign unitary state, and because of this, Romania will never accept the concept of collective rights for minorities.”⁴¹

Instead of putting an end to the autonomy issue, the government rhetoric only added more fuel to fire, and Romanian nationalists wanted a piece of the argument. In March of 2010, Corneliu Vadim Tudor – leader of the Greater Romania Party and a Member of the European Parliament – went as far as to say that there is no such thing as Székely Land, and that „there is only Romania, a national sovereign unitary state.”⁴² László Tőkés – a Member of the European Parliament, and president of the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania – replied that ethnic Hungarians „should take it to the street, following the Catalan pattern”,⁴³ and later, in December of 2010, he pointed out that „there is now a unique chance in the last 20 years for the Hungarians to return to the proper road, with this moment being adequate for the change of the national policy, that should be focused on autonomy.”⁴⁴ He even took his demands with him to Brussels, where in January of this year, the Romanian President sharply addressed them before the European Parliament: „Romania will not embrace a legal framework of autonomy on ethnic considerations.”⁴⁵ Despite this, Hunor Kelemen, the newly elected chairman of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), said in March of 2011 that the organization he leads „will not change the basic goal of autonomy and collective rights.”⁴⁶

With the peoples’ right of self determination surpassing in importance the fundamentals of state sovereignty – as dictated by the UN Resolution 1973 (2011) – this paper ends all too abruptly with a simple but significant dilemma: If the calls for greater autonomy are not answered by the Romanian state, could Székely Land become one day the next Kosovo – as László Tőkés suggests that it could – or even the next Benghazi? While most international security analysts would disagree that this scenario is at all possible, it is important to consider that these same security analysts failed to foresee the unrest in North Africa and in the Middle East. I challenge the readers to ask themselves: if Székely Land takes it to the streets, what can the Romanian government do to stop the unrest? And more importantly, can the Romanian authorities afford to continue relying on the tenets of a dying Westphalian order by underscoring its monopoly on the legitimate use of force?

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NOTE

ALEXANDER GHALEB – Graduate student specializing in Strategic Security Studies with the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) at the National Defense University. He is also a military offi-cer, currently serving in the United States Army – Special Operations Forces. He is of both Romanian and Székely descent.

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